An Economic Analysis of Regulation of Urban Public Transport in Europe by Preston, J.
This is a repository copy of An Economic Analysis of Regulation of Urban Public Transport
in Europe.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/2098/
Monograph:
Preston, J. (1997) An Economic Analysis of Regulation of Urban Public Transport in 
Europe. Working Paper. Institute of Transport Studies, University of Leeds , Leeds, UK. 
Working Paper 506
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
See Attached 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
   
 
 
 
White Rose Research Online 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
 
 
 
 
Institute of Transport Studies
University of Leeds 
 
 
This is an ITS Working Paper produced and published by the University of 
Leeds. ITS Working Papers are intended to provide information and encourage 
discussion on a topic in advance of formal publication. They represent only the 
views of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views or approval of the 
sponsors.  
 
 
White Rose Repository URL for this paper: 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/2098
 
 
 
Published paper 
Preston, J. (1997) An Economic Analysis of Regulation of Urban Public Transport 
in Europe. Institute of Transport Studies, University of Leeds, Working Paper 506
 
 
 
 
 
White Rose Consortium ePrints Repository 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................. 1 
THEORETICAL RESEARCH ............................................................................................................. 2 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH.................................................................................................................... 3 
CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................................................................... 7 
FURTHER WORK ................................................................................................................................ 8 
IMPROVED STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION FOR URBAN TRANSPORT OPERATIONS OF PASSENGER IN 
EUROPE (ISOTOPE) ................................................................................................................................. 9 
CHAPTER 1......................................................................................................................................... 9 
Nature And Contents Of This Report................................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER 2....................................................................................................................................... 10 
Theoretical Research ......................................................................................................................... 10 
2.1 CLASSIFICATION OF REGULATORY STRUCTURES........................................................ 10 
2.1.1      FUNCTIONAL DIVISIONS .............................................................................................................. 10 
2.1.2      CONTRACT FORM........................................................................................................................ 11 
2.1.3      CHOICE OF SELECTION METHOD.................................................................................................. 12 
2.1.3.1  DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TENDERING AND FRANCHISIN ................................................................. 12 
2.1.3.2  DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTRACTING AND TENDERING/FRANCHISING ..................................... 12 
2.1.4      INTEGRATION OF THE THREE DIMENSIONS .................................................................................. 12 
2.1.5     THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF EACH MODEL .............................................................. 18 
 
2.2 PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY AND COMMERCIAL PUBLIC  
TRANSPORT SERVICES............................................................................................................. 19 
 
2.3 PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY AND CONTRACTED PUBLIC  
TRANSPORT SERVICES............................................................................................................. 22 
 
2.4 THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ....................................................... 23 
2.5 COMPETITION - SIMULATION MODELS ............................................................................. 26 
2.5.1 STOCKHOLM - ARLANDA AIRPORT.................................................................................................. 26 
2.5.2 MANCHESTER ................................................................................................................................. 32 
CHAPTER 3....................................................................................................................................... 36 
Empirical Results............................................................................................................................... 36 
3.1 PARTIAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY AND COST EFFICIENCY INDICES ..................... 36 
3.2 COST AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS .................................................................................................... 39 
3.3 QUALITY INDICATORS ....................................................................................................................... 42 
3.4 OPERATING COST ANALYSIS................................................................................................. 54 
3.5 DEMAND ANALYSIS................................................................................................................... 59
  
 
 
 
 
3.6 FRANCHISING ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................ 62 
3.6.1 RESULTS FROM THE ISOTOPE DATABASE ..................................................................................... 62 
3.6.2 NORDIC COUNTRIES .............................................................................................................. 64 
3.6.2.1 SWEDEN ...................................................................................................................................... 64 
3.6.2.2  FINLAND ..................................................................................................................................... 65 
3.6.2.3  NORWAY .................................................................................................................................... 65 
3.6.3 GREAT BRITAIN.............................................................................................................................. 67 
3.6.4 THE NETHERLANDS ........................................................................................................................ 68 
CHAPTER 4....................................................................................................................................... 70 
CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................ 70 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 75 
  
 
TABLE OF TABLES 
 
TABLE E1:     SUMMARY OF KEY INDICATORS. 3 
TABLE E2:     COMPARISON OF KEY INDICATORS FOR URBAN BUS SERVICES 4 
TABLE E3:     SUMMARY OF QUALITY INDICATORS 5 
TABLE 2.1.1:  RISK AND CONTRACT TYPES 13 
TABLE 2.1.2:  TENDERING FOR THE PRODUCTION OF PRE-DETERMINED  
SERVICES 14 
TABLE 2.1.3:  NETWORK MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS 15 
TABLE 2.1.4: TENDERING OF PRE-DETERMINED SERVICES WITH 16 
RE-DESIGNING INCENTIVES 16 
TABLE 2.1.5:  FREE COMPETITION, MARKET BASED MODEL 17 
TABLE 2.2.1:  FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE. 22 
TABLE 2.4.1:  PRIVATE V PUBLIC SECTOR ANALYSIS : SIMULATION RESULTS 24 
TABLE 2.4.2:  STRENGTHS OF ARGUMENT AGAINST PRIVATE SECTOR 
RESPONSIBILITY 25 
TABLE 2.5.1:  CASES 28 
TABLE 2.5.2:  TRIPS PER YEAR (2005) BY OPERATOR 30 
TABLE 2.5.3:  CONSUMER SURPLUS IN SEK PER YEAR 30 
TABLE 2.5.4:  OPERATORS’ PRODUCER SURPLUS (INCL. TERMINAL INVESTMENTS) 
IN SEK PER YEAR 31 
TABLE 2.5.5:  TOTAL WELFARE (IN SEK PER YEAR) 31 
TABLE 2.5.6:  MANCHESTER INITIAL MODEL TEST RESULTS 34 
TABLE 2.5.7:  FINAL MANCHESTER MODEL TESTS 35 
TABLE 3.1.1:  PRODUCTIVITY INDICATORS - BUS 37 
TABLE 3.1.2:  PRODUCTIVITY INDICATORS - RAIL BASED MODES 38 
TABLE 3.2.1:  FAREBOX RATIOS IN DIFFERENT EUROPEAN CITIES 40 
TABLE 3.2.2:  SUBSIDY AND COMMERCIAL INCOME RATES AS PERCENTAGES OF 
TOTAL OPERATING COST 41 
TABLE 3.3.1:  EVALUATION OF FORMS OF ORGANISATION 42 
TABLE 3.3.2:  QUALITY INDICATORS - BUS 45 
TABLE 3.3.3:  QUALITY INDICATORS - TRAM 47 
TABLE 3.3.4 :  QUALITY INDICATORS - UNDERGROUND 48 
TABLE 3.3.5:  QUALITY INDICATORS - SUBURBAN RAIL 49 
TABLE 3.3.6:  OPINION OF THE AUTHORITIES ON EFFICIENCY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS 50 
TABLE 3.3.7:  THE OPINION OF THE AUTHORITIES AND OPERATORS ON THE 
CURRENT SYSTEM 51 
TABLE 3.3.8:  THE OPINION OF VARIOUS GROUPS ON THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
(ANSWERS GIVEN BY AUTHORITIES) 52 
TABLE 3.3.9:  WHO SHOULD BE THE DECISION MAKERS IN QUALITY ASPECTS 
(ANSWERS GIVEN BY THE AUTHORITIES) 53 
TABLE 3.4.1: PREFERRED TRANSLOG MODEL OF OPERATING COSTS 55 
TABLE 3.5.1:  PRICE AND SERVICE ELASTICITIES 60 
TABLE 3.5.2:  DEMAND MODEL - RESIDUAL ANALYSIS 61 
TABLE 3.6.1:  SUB-CONTRACT/TENDERING INDICES - BUS (OPERATOR) 62 
TABLE 3.6.2:  TENDERING INDICES - BUS (AUTHORITIES) 63 
TABLE 4.1:     COMPARISON OF KEY INDICATORS FOR URBAN BUS SERVICES 71 
TABLE 4.2:     SUMMARY OF QUALITY INDICATORS 72 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
The objective of this work is to apply economic analysis to urban public transport, at 
both a theoretical and an empirical level, in order to assess efficiency in terms of both 
production and consumption.  Our study is the first attempt to look systematically at this 
issue for urban transport at the European level.  In so doing we aim to identify the 
organisational and regulatory features of systems that are efficient in both production 
and consumption. 
 
Our starting point is an admittedly simplified classification of three broad types of 
regulatory structure in urban public transport in Europe. 
 
1. Regulated, publicly owned monopolies (`the classical model').  This is the 
dominant organisational form in 10 member states (AT, BE, DE, ES, LU, GR, 
IE, IT, NL, PT), although there may be in these states some cities that have 
variations on this regulatory structure (e.g. regulated, private monopoly) or may 
have an alternative regulatory structure (e.g. some cities in ES have network 
management contracts). 
 
2. Limited Competition Models.  This has a number of variants.  The two most 
common are the Scandinavian model, based on minimum cost tenders at a route 
level and represented in three member states (DK, FI, SE), with a variant also in 
Norway, and the French model, based on network management contracts. 
 
3. Deregulated, Free Market Models.  This is dominant form in GB outside 
London.  In London route based tendering has been implemented. 
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Theoretical research 
 
Our theoretical analysis has been based on two broad methodologies: Principal-Agent 
Analysis (PAA) and Micro-Economic Simulation Models (MESMs).  Our key finding 
from PAA is that private firms are likely to be more effective in maximising profits due 
to incentives provided by take-over constraints, bankruptcy constraints, shareholder 
monitoring and lack of interference from politicians and civil servants.  Management 
Employee Buy Outs (MEBOs) are likely to be transient phenomena unless restrictions 
are made to selling the business on.  MESMs suggest that public intervention is required 
to maximise welfare due to user economies of scale (user benefit from increased service 
levels) and second best arguments (subsidy required to offset the impact of congestion, 
accidents and environmental pollution by cars).  In a case study it is shown that profit 
maximisation can reduce net economic benefits by between 44% and 54% compared to 
perfect planning. Our conclusion from this part of our work is therefore that deregulated 
firms are potentially efficient in terms of production but not in terms of consumption.  
Regulated firms are potentially efficient in terms of consumption but not in terms of 
production.    
 
Other key findings from our theoretical research include the following.   
 
Firstly, distinction should be made between three functional levels: the strategic level 
(what do we want to achieve?), the tactical level (what product can help achieve the 
aims?) and the operational level (how do we produce the product?).   
 
Secondly, there are a number of issues concerning contract specification and selection  
method (competition-for-the-market).  PAA suggests that competitive tendering may be 
the most appropriate selection method for operational level decisions but may be less 
appropriate for tactical and strategic level decisions where experience acts as a barrier 
and external factors are important.  In terms of contract specification, PAA suggests net 
subsidy contracts should be more efficient than full cost contracts but this assumes 
perfect knowledge and/or risk neutrality, neither of which are likely to apply in real life 
situations.  Empirical evidence is therefore required. 
 
Thirdly, there are a number of issues concerning open access (competition-in-the-
market).  MESMs suggest that in certain instances competition may increase net social 
benefit, where it leads to new products (e.g. the Arlanda Airport Rail Link, Manchester 
Metrolink) or new pricing structures.  However, our MESMs also suggest that 
competition may reduce net social benefit where it leads to duplication of services or 
excessive price wars.  Again empirical evidence is required. 
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Empirical research 
 
This work was based on the ISOTOPE quantitative database which consisted of data on 
207 public transport operators from 108 cities.  The emphasis was on the development 
of performance indicators and elasticity estimates.  A summary of the key indicators for 
bus and rail based systems is given by Table E1. 
 
TABLE E1:  SUMMARY OF KEY INDICATORS. 
 
 Bus Rail 
Cost Recovery Ratio 
Fare per Pass Km (Ecus) 
Mean load (Pass) 
Cost per Pass Km 
Wage Rate (Ecus per annum) 
Non staff cost per Vehicle Km 
Revenue per Vehicle Km 
Cost per Vehicle Km 
Vehicle Km per Staff 
0.51 
0.08 
22 
0.24 
29437 
1.27 
1.28 
2.6 
17336 
0.37 
0.11 
40 
0.47 
33564 
5.3 
1.85 
7.48 
11241 
 
Table E1 indicates that bus systems have a much higher cost-recovery ratio and vehicle 
km per member of staff than rail systems and much lower cost per passenger km, wage 
rates, non staff cost per  vehicle km and cost per vehicle km.  By contrast, rail systems 
can charge higher fares per passenger km (reflecting advantages in terms of speed)  and 
have higher mean loads (reflecting the use of larger vehicles).  Nonetheless, rail costs 
per passenger km are 96% higher than those of bus, whilst revenue per passenger km is 
only 38% higher than bus.  This may suggest that there is some inefficiency in 
consumption in that high fare:high quality rail systems are being used in situations 
where lower fare:lower quality bus systems may be more appropriate.  However, it 
should be noted that our  sample excludes the European Union's largest cities (London 
and Paris) where rail may be most  appropriate. 
 
In Table E2 we make some comparisons for bus systems between the three regulatory 
forms we have identified.  Our results indicate that  regulated markets may be effective 
in terms of consumption  in that load factors are 62% higher than those in deregulated 
markets and 127% higher than those found in limited competition markets.  This may 
not however indicate efficiency.  It may indicates that too few bus services are being 
produced at too low fares.   
 
The financial effectiveness of deregulated systems  is also evident. On average, they  
cover 85% of costs, compared to 47% for both limited competition and regulated 
markets.  Again this does not necessarily signify efficiency.  It may indicate that 
subsidies are too low in deregulated markets.    
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In terms of cost efficiency, the costs per vehicle km for deregulated systems are 52% 
less than those for regulated systems and  36% lower than those for limited competition 
systems.   
 
In terms of labour productivity, the best performance is posted by the limited 
competition systems where vehicle kms per member of staff is 8% higher than in 
deregulated markets and 18% higher than in regulated markets, although this may 
reflect variations in input prices.   
 
Overall, there is some support for the hypotheses that regulated markets are efficient in 
terms of consumption, deregulated markets are efficient in terms of production and  
limited competition markets  are somewhere in between. 
 
TABLE E2:  COMPARISON OF KEY INDICATORS FOR URBAN BUS SERVICES 
 
 R/TC PK/VK VK/SN TC/VK 
Deregulated 
GB 
 
0.85 
 
16.7 
 
17,987 
 
1.44 
Limited Comp. 
DK,FR,FI, 
NO,SE  
 
0.47 
 
11.9 
 
19,383 
 
2.26 
Regulated 
AT,BE,DE, 
ES,GR,IE,IT,LU, PT,NL 
 
0.47 
 
27.0 
 
16,387 
 
2.97 
R = Revenue, TC  = Total Cost, PK = Passenger Kms, VK = Vehicle Kms, 
SN = Staff Numbers 
 
Macro-economic considerations related to the Maastricht agreement, should lead to 
reductions in public transport subsidy levels.  However, there is no sign of such 
convergence at present.  Analysis of the finances of urban public transport in 52 cities in 
the early 1990s, failed to indicate any convergence in terms of financial performance.  
Although relative subsidy went down in 25 cities, it remained stable in 13 and actually 
increased in 14 cities. 
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TABLE E3:  SUMMARY OF QUALITY INDICATORS 
 
 Regulated Limited Comp. Deregulated 
Supply 
Network Design 
Effectiveness 
Convenience 
Environmental 
Speed 
Security 
Affordability 
Delivery 
Customer Opinions 
- 
0/+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0/+ 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0/+ 
0/+ 
0 
0 
0 
0/+ 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0 
- 
- 
0 
0 
+- = Positive performance, - = Negative performance, 0 = Neutral performance 
 
An important issue relates to the quality of output.  The three broad organisational forms 
were assessed in terms of 10 quality indicators, the first eight of which relate to strategic 
and tactical functions, and the last two of which relate to operational functions.  The 
results are summarised by Table E3.  Our results are qualitative but what they suggest is 
that regulated systems have advantages of affordability but low fares may result in 
inadequate investment and low levels of supply.  These results may reflect the political 
context rather than the organisational structure.  By contrast, deregulated regimes may 
perform well in terms of supply indicators but less well in terms of most other 
indicators.  Models of limited competition may have quality advantages, particularly if 
contracts include appropriate incentives.  The opinion surveys seem to confirm the 
perceived efficiency and effectiveness of limited competition models. 
 
Econometric analysis was undertaken in order to determine elasticity estimates.  Due to 
data limitations, and despite the use of additional data collected by Wunsch, this work 
was limited to bus systems.  A translog model of operating costs was developed based 
on 56 observations.  This model indicated an elasticity of cost with respect to vehicle 
kms of 1.16 and an elasticity of costs with respect to line km of 0.25. This suggests for 
the average system mild diseconomies of both density (return to density of 0.86) and 
scale (return to scale of 0.71).  Our model suggests that the optimal fleet size is around 
100 vehicles.  It is interesting to note that large bus companies are emerging in Europe 
based on subsidiary companies of around 100 vehicles.  These companies are attempting 
to simultaneously have the advantages of being big (which allows purchasing power in 
terms of fuel, vehicles and capital and may allow economies of scale in terms of 
marketing) and being small (which allows operating costs to be minimised). Our 
translog model also indicates a labour input elasticity with respect to price of -0.34, a 
capital input elasticity with respect to price of -0.18 and an elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour of unity.  This indicates strong substitutability between 
capital and labour.   The last key finding of our translog model is that cost for Great 
Britain are 56% below those of the rest of Europe, even when output and input prices 
are held constant. 
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A log-linear model of demand was also developed  based on data for the bus systems in 
89 cities.  This indicated an elasticity of demand with respect to fares of -0.50 for small 
cities and -0.34 for large cities.  The corresponding elasticities of demand with respect 
to service were 0.33 and 0.49.  The model indicated higher than average levels of 
demand in German and Swiss cities and lower than average levels of demand in France. 
 
Empirical analysis of tendering suggest that cost reductions of between 10% and 20%  
can be achieved if there is no restructuring, whilst reductions of 35% or more can be 
achieved if there is also restructuring (fragmentation and privatisation).  Studies in Great 
Britain indicate that minimum cost contracts may reduce subsidy by 13% compared to 
minimum subsidy contracts provided there is strong competition.  Evidence from 
Sweden suggests cost plus contracts may increase costs by 18% compared to fixed cost 
contracts.  Swedish data also suggests that moving from one bid per contract to two 
reduces costs by 12%, moving from one bid to three reduces costs by 17% and moving 
from one bid to four bids reduces costs by 20%. 
 
British data indicates that vehicle size and age specifications may increase subsidy by 5-
10%, whilst Swedish data suggests that including penalties for late running increases 
costs by around 30%. 
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Conclusions 
 
Deregulated markets have theoretical and empirical advantages in terms of efficiency of 
production. Regulated markets have theoretical and empirical advantages in terms of 
efficiency in consumption. Limited competition markets may have advantages of both.  
Overall, we find some support   for the Citizens’ Network Green Paper's preference for 
some form of limited competition model.  However, the main advantage of such models 
is not "to provide an environment which gives operators an incentive to raise standards 
whilst safeguarding system integration" (although they can do this) but in increasing 
efficiency in production whilst maintaining or improving efficiency in consumption.   
Work Package Three's work suggests that  in some areas, reductions in unit operating 
costs of up to 50% are possible.  Where redundancies and wage reductions are not 
possible these reductions will reduce to around 15% but are still likely to be the main 
gain of introducing competitive tendering to commercialised but publicly owned and/or 
regulated operations.  These cost savings could then be used to improve the quality of 
public transport services, the quality of other public services or to reduce taxation.   In 
order to make such gains, it may be necessary to restructure the bus industry in many 
member states and to develop and enforce appropriate competition policy. 
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Further Work 
 
Finally, it is worth making a number of points that should be addressed by future 
researchers.  Firstly, our work has been effected by a number of data problems that stem 
from a lack of consistent data on urban transport operations at a European level.  There 
were a large number of comparability issues that the ISOTOPE database, given its 
limited resources, was unable to overcome.  Given the large amounts of taxpayers 
money that urban public transport receives it would be in the public interest for a 
consistent set of data to be collected so that assessments of value for money could be 
made.  Any move to comprehensive competitive tendering would require such a 
database to be constructed. 
 
Secondly, we have outlined at least three forms of competitive tendering that could be 
applied to urban public transport.  We believe that future work should make a more 
detailed assessment of these three forms and explore the large number of possible 
variants.  The link between organisational and regulatory structure should be also 
explored in more detail. 
 
Thirdly, in considering  the trade-off between efficiency in production and consumption 
it is clear that the former is more readily measurable than the  latter.  This may have 
resulted in an over emphasis on cost cutting at the expense of quality improvements.  
Consumer surplus (expressed as per passenger km) might be considered as a possible 
summary measure of efficiency in consumption. 
 
Fourthly, some of our simulation work raised important issues.  The Arlanda study 
indicate that further information is needed on the extent to which public transport 
improvements can abstract demand from the car and the extent to which it can generate 
brand new trips.  The Manchester study indicated the need for more detailed data on the 
variation of network capital and operating costs for both passenger and vehicle kms.
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Improved Structure and Organisation for Urban Transport Operations of 
Passenger in Europe (ISOTOPE) 
 
Final Report on Work Package 3 (Economic Research) 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Nature And Contents Of This Report 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The objective of this work package is to apply economic analysis to urban public 
transport, both at an empirical and a theoretical level, in order to assess efficiency in 
terms of both production and consumption.  By efficiency in production, we mean 
producing a given level of output at minimum cost.  By efficiency in consumption, we 
mean that outputs and prices are set so as to maximise economic efficiency. 
 
This final  report is an upgraded version of the interim report presented to the seminar 
on "Facts and Opinions on Urban Public Transport in the European Union" in Lisbon 
on 3-4 October 1996 and is structured as follows. 
 
In section 2, we consider the relevance of economic theory to organisational and 
regulatory issues in urban public transport.  We begin in section 2.1 by developing a 
classification of regulatory structures  and, in section 2.2, we go on to analyse how 
principal-agent theory may explain some of the success of privately owned firms in 
urban public transport.  In section 2.3, we show how principal-agent theory may also 
be used to design contracts between the public and private sector.  In section 2.4, we 
assess the role of public and private sector bodies in urban public transport.  In section 
2.5, we go on to use competition simulation models to assess the impact of new 
services in Stockholm and Manchester. 
 
In section 3, we consider the role of empirical analysis in addressing organisational 
and regulatory issues in urban public transport.  We use the ISOTOPE database 
developed by Work Package One, supplemented by other documentary databases.  In 
section 3.1, we develop some partial factor productivity measures, whilst in section 
3.2 and 3.3 we examine financial indicators and quality indicators.  In section 3.4 and 
3.5, we examine operator costs and demand respectively.  Lastly, in section 3.6, we 
consider the role of franchising, using data from a variety of sources. 
 
We end in section 4 by drawing a series of conclusions from both our theoretical and 
empirical work and make some recommendations for further work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Theoretical Research 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2.1 Classification of regulatory structures 
 
Work undertaken by van de Velde and Van Reeven (1996) suggests that there are 
three fundamental questions: 
 
x What is the most desirable functional division between authorities, planners and 
operators? 
x What is the most desirable contract form? 
x What is the most adequate method to select operators? 
 
These questions will be considered in turn. 
 
2.1.1 Functional divisions 
It is generally accepted that planning and control systems within companies can be 
divided into hierarchically ordered types of activities which differentiate themselves 
according to the scope of the planning issues addressed and the planning horizon. 
Anthony (1965) was probably the first to introduce a framework in which planning 
and control processes are divided into three hierarchical activities. Anthony (1988, p. 
30-40) defined them as follows (although the boundaries of these processes are not 
totally sharp):  
x Strategic planning is the process of deciding on the goals of the organisation and 
the strategies for attaining these goals.  
x Management control is the process by which managers influence other members of 
the organisation to implement the organisation's strategies.  
x Task control is the process of assuring that specific tasks are carried out effectively 
and efficiently.  
 
Various words are used to denominate these hierarchical levels of planning and 
control activities (see, e.g., Hellriegel and Slocum, 1986). In our work  we will use the 
following definitions: 
x Strategic level: strategic management is involved in the formulation of general 
aims and in the determination in broad terms of the means that can be used to 
attain these - in short: what do we want to achieve? 
x Tactical level: makes decisions on acquiring means that can help reaching the 
aims, and on how to use these means most efficiently -in short: what product can 
help achieving the aims? 
x Operational level: makes sure the orders are carried out, and that this happens in 
an efficient way - in short: how do we produce that product? 
 
 
 11 
2.1.2  Contract form 
One of the objectives of contracts in public transport is the distribution of  
responsibilities between the parties to the contract. An important element is the 
allocation of financial risks between buyer and seller because some allocations can be 
more expensive than others. Also, the addition of financial incentives can help realise 
the objectives of the buyer. 
 
Two types of risks can be distinguished in the situation that a governmental agency 
orders public transport services from a supplier: 
Production risk: risk associated to the production costs of a fixed production 
quantity, independent of the amount of passengers. 
Revenue risk: risk associated to the sale of transport services. 
 
These risks can be allocated in different ways. The different possible allocations of 
risks give rise to the following distinction of contracts: 
 
Gross cost contract: In this type of contract the production risk is born by a transport 
company while the revenue risk is born by the tendering authority. An agreed price 
will be paid for the production of a fixed amount of services. Revenues accrue to the 
tendering authority. The difference between realised costs and anticipated costs (the 
price) is for account of the firm while the difference between actual and anticipated 
revenues is for account of the tendering authority. 
 
Net cost contract: In this contract both production and revenue risk are born by the 
transport company. The difference between anticipated total operating costs and 
revenues determines the price the tendering authority pays to the transport company. 
A realised difference between costs and revenues that does not correspond to the 
anticipated difference between costs and revenues is for account of the transport 
company. 
 
Management contract: The management contract is the mirror image of the net cost 
contract because in the management contract both production and revenue risk are 
born by the tendering authority instead of the transport company. The manager of the 
transport activities receives a remuneration which is independent of his achievements. 
 
Besides these three types of contract, all kinds of variants are possible. The success of 
contracts will be determined by the incentive structure including those incorporated in 
the contract (basic incentives) and those provided by other regulatory instruments 
(additional incentives), for example provided by competition policy.  In addition, a 
distinction should be made between discrete incentives (e.g. the award of a contract) 
and continuous incentives (e.g. performance bonuses or penalties). 
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2.1.3 Choice of selection method 
The choice of selection method may be split between no selection method (based 
instead on historic rights),  selection methods based on negotiation, some form of 
competitive tendering  and market competition.  Important questions concern ensuring 
reasonable selection costs, choosing bids that vary in service quality the treatment of 
non-compliant bids and the publication of information in order to ensure fair 
competition (Van de Velde and Sleuwaegen, 1996). 
 
2.1.3.1 Difference between tendering and franchisin 
 
Both in a tendering and in a franchising process several potential operators bid for the 
right to operate in a certain area for a specific time period according to clearly defined 
contractual rules. 
 
We define the main difference between tendering and franchising to be the larger 
scope for the operators (winning bidder) to modify the product or production  size 
under a franchising agreement.  Also, on average, a franchising agreement will 
impose more risks on the operator than a tendering contract. 
 
In short, in a tendering situation the operator produces what has been asked for.  
While in a franchising situation, the operator behaves more like an entrepreneur while 
still following a number of ground rules which have been agreed upon at the letting of 
the contract. 
 
2.1.3.2 Difference Between Contracting and Tendering/Franchising 
The difference between contracting and tendering/franchising  resides in the selection 
procedure used by the principal who selects the agent. 
 
In a tendering/franchising  procedure the agent  is selected according to a competitive 
procedure which respects a number of objectivity rule.  In a contracting  situation the 
agent is selected according to the private preferences of intuition  of the principal. 
 
2.1.4 Integration of the three dimensions 
Based on allocation of risks, four types of competitive tendering can be envisaged 
(see Table 2.1.1): 
x Subsidy  contracts result in the operator taking both the revenue and the production 
cost risk.  This is the dominant form of tendering used for socially necessary 
services in the English Metropolitan (big city) areas 
x Cost contracts result in the operator taking the production cost risk and the 
authority the revenue risk.  This is the dominant form of tendering used for socially 
necessary services in the English Shire (small city and rural) areas. 
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x Hybrid contracts where risks are shared between operators and authorities.  
Examples include Adelaide (Australia) and Helsingborg (Sweden). 
x Management contracts where risks are borne by the authority.  This form  is 
common in  France but often complemented with additional contractual incentives. 
 
TABLE 2.1.1:  RISK AND CONTRACT TYPES 
 
  
PRODUCTION RISK 
BORN BY  
 
  
  AGENT 
(TRANSPORTER) 
(BOTH) 
 
PRINCIPAL  
(PTA OR PTE) 
REVENUE AGENT 
(TRANSPORTER) 
NET COST CONTRACT 
  
RISK (BOTH) (NET COST 
CONTRACTWITH 
SHARED REVENUE 
RISK) (GROSS COST 
CONTRACT WITH 
REVENUE NCENTIVES)
(MANAGEMENT 
CONTRACT 
WITH 
PRODUCTIVITY 
ANDREVENUE 
INCENTIVES) 
 
BORN BY PRINCIPAL 
(PTA OR PTE) 
GROSS COST 
CONTRACT 
 
(MANAGEMENT 
CONTRACTWITH 
PRODUCTIVITY 
INCENTIVES) 
MANAGEMENT 
CONTRACT 
 
Based on this analysis and analysis of the types of bodies responsible for strategic, 
tactical and operational functions, four forms of market organisation can be identified 
as providing alternatives to the classic, regulated model: 
x The Scandinavian model - essentially based on a mixture of minimum subsidy and 
minimum cost contracts at a route level (also London) 
x The French model - based on network management contracts with additional 
contractual incentives 
x The Adelaide model - intermediate contracts where operators have some freedom 
to develop services 
x The Market Competition model, which accounts for 85% of bus services in Great 
Britain, outside London. 
 
These four models are represented by Tables 2.1.2 to 2.1.5 respectively. 
 
These forms of market selection may form part of a deregulatory progression i.e. the 
Scandinavian model is an initial step, the Adelaide model is a second step and the 
market competition model is a third (and final) step. 
 
An important issue is whether theoretical analysis of these organisational forms can 
prescribe which are optimal (in an economic sense).  Such analysis suggest that 
competitive tendering is unlikely to be adequate at the tactical level because local 
experience will act as a barrier to entry and external factors are difficult to forecast 
(although planning authorities do often make use of external contractors, such as 
consultants).  At an operational level competitive tendering of some form should be  
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adequate, although even here there may be constraints where the incumbent lacks 
market discipline and there are few potential entrants.  Theoretical analysis is less 
useful in determining what types of competitive tendering are optimal.  Here 
empirical research is likely to be more fruitful. 
 
TABLE 2.1.2:  TENDERING FOR THE PRODUCTION OF PRE-DETERMINED SERVICES 
(The Scandinavian Model) 
 
ACTOR REGIONAL 
AUTHORITY 
(RTA) 
 REGIONAL 
TRANSPORT 
COMPANY 
(RTC) 
BUS 
COMPANIES 
RAIL, METRO  
OR TRAM 
COMPANIES 
 
TYPE POLITICAL 
BODY  
REGIONAL 
TRANSPORT 
DEPARTMENT  
PUBLICLY 
OWNED 
REGIONAL 
COMPANY 
PRIVATELY 
OWNED 
COMPANIES 
PUBLICLY OR 
PRIVATELY 
OWNED 
COMPANIES  
 
RELATION UNDER 
DEMOCRATIC 
CONTROL 
HIERARCHI-
CALLY 
CONTROLLED BY 
THE POLITICAL 
BODY 
MANAGE-
MENT 
CONTRACT 
WITH RTA 
CONTRACT 
WITH RTC 
AFTER 
TENDERING 
CONTRACT 
WITH RTC 
AFTER 
NEGOTIATION 
 
MODE OF 
TRANSPORT 
ALL  ALL BUSES RAIL 
 
STRATEGIC TRANSPORT 
POLICY 
    
 SOCIAL 
POLICY 
    
 (DISCUSSION) STANDARDS OF 
ACCESSIBILITY 
(SUGGESTIONS) 
 
 (DISCUSSION) (SOCIAL) 
STANDARDS OF 
MOBILITY 
(SUGGESTIONS) 
 
TACTICAL 
  FARES   
 
  ROUTES  (SUGGESTIONS) 
 
 
  TIMETABLE 
 
(SUGGESTIONS) 
 
 
  VEHICLE TYPE 
 
(SUGGESTIONS) 
 
OPERATIONAL 
  VEHICLE 
ROSTER-
ING 
(SUGGES-
TIONS) 
VEHICLE 
ROSTERING 
 
 
   PERSONNEL 
ROSTERING 
PERSONNEL 
ROSTERING 
 
 
   PERSONNEL  
MANAGE-
MENT 
PERSONNEL  
MANAGEMENT 
 
 
   VEHICLE  
MAIN-
TENANCE 
VEHICLE  
MAINTENANCE 
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TABLE 2.1.3:  NETWORK MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS 
(The French Model) 
 
ACTOR REGIONAL 
AUTHORITY 
(RTA) 
 REGIONAL 
TRANSPORT 
COMPANY 
(RTC) 
BUS 
COMPANIES 
RAILWAY  
COMPANIES 
 
TYPE POLITICAL 
BODY 
REGIONAL 
TRANSPORT 
DEPARTMENT
PRIVATE 
NETWORK 
MANAGER / 
TRANSPORT 
COMPANY  
PRIVATELY 
OWNED 
COMPANIES 
PUBLICLY OR 
PRIVATELY 
OWNED 
COMPANIES 
 
RELATION UNDER 
DEMOCRATIC 
CONTROL 
HIERARC-
HICALLY 
CONTROLLED 
BY THE 
POLITICAL 
BODY 
CONTRACT 
WITH  RTA 
AFTER 
TENDERING 
CONTRACT 
WITH RTC 
AFTER 
TENDERING 
CONTRACT 
WITH RTC 
AFTER 
TENDERING 
 
MODE OF 
TRANSPORT 
ALL  ALL BUS TRAIN 
 
STRATEGIC TRANSPORT POLICY 
 
 SOCIAL POLICY 
 
 (DISCUSSION) STANDARDS OF ACCESSI-BILITY 
 
 (DISCUSSION) (SOCIAL) STANDARDS OF MOBILITY 
 
TACTICAL 
 (MIN. 
STANDARD) 
FARES   
 
 (MIN. 
STANDARD) 
ROUTES  (SUGGESTIONS)
 
 
 (MIN. 
STANDARD) 
TIMETABLE  (SUGGESTIONS)
 
 
 (MIN. 
STANDARD) 
VEHICLE 
TYPE 
 (SUGGESTIONS)
 
OPERATIONAL 
  VEHICLE 
ROSTERING 
VEHICLE 
ROSTERING 
VEHICLE 
ROSTERING 
 
 
  PERSONNEL 
ROSTERING 
PERSONNEL 
ROSTERING 
PERSONNEL 
ROSTERING 
 
 
  PERSONNEL 
MANAGE-
MENT 
PERSONNEL  
MANAGEMENT 
PERSONNEL  
MANAGEMENT 
 
 
  VEHICLE  
MAIN-
TENANCE 
VEHICLE  
MAIN- 
TENANCE 
VEHICLE  
MAINTENANCE
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TABLE 2.1.4: TENDERING OF PRE-DETERMINED SERVICES WITH  
 RE-DESIGNING INCENTIVES 
(The Adelaide Model) 
 
ACTOR REGIONAL 
AUTHORITY 
(RTA) 
 REGIONAL 
TRANSPORT 
COMPANY (RTC)
BUS 
 COMPANIES 
RAIL, METRO 
OR TRAM 
COMPANIES 
 
TYPE POLITICAL 
BODY 
REGIONAL 
TRANSPORT 
DEPARTMENT 
PUBLICLY 
OWNED 
REGIONAL 
COMPANY 
PRIVATELY  
OWNED  
COMPANIES 
PUBLICLY OR 
PRIVATELY 
OWNED 
COMPANIES 
 
RELATION UNDER 
DEMOCRATIC 
CONTROL 
HIER-
ARCHICALLY 
CONTROLLED 
BY THE 
POLITICAL 
BODY 
MANAGEMENT 
CONTRACT 
WITH THE  
RTA 
CONTRACT  
WITH RTC  
AFTER 
TENDERING 
CONTRACT 
WITH RTC 
AFTER 
NEGOTIATION 
 
MODE OF 
TRANSPORT 
ALL  ALL BUS RAIL 
 
STRATEGIC TRANSPORT POLICY 
 
   
 SOCIAL POLICY 
 
   
 (DISCUSSION) STANDARDS OF 
ACCESSIBILITY 
(SUGGESTIONS)   
 (DISCUSSION) (SOCIAL) 
STANDARDS OF 
MOBILITY 
(SUGGESTIONS)   
TACTICAL 
  FARES   
 
  (MIN. 
STANDARD) 
ROUTES ROUTES 
 
 
  (MIN. 
STANDARD) 
TIMETABLE TIMETABLE 
 
 
  (MIN. 
STANDARD) 
VEHICLE 
TYPE 
VEHICLE TYPE 
 
OPERA-
TIONAL 
   VEHICLE 
ROSTERING 
VEHICLE 
ROSTERING 
 
 
   PERSONNEL 
ROSTERING 
PERSONNEL 
ROSTERING 
 
 
   PERSONNEL  
MANAGE-
MENT 
PERSONNEL  
MANAGEMENT 
 
 
   VEHICLE  
MAIN-
TENANCE 
VEHICLE  
MAINTENANCE
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TABLE 2.1.5:  FREE COMPETITION, MARKET BASED MODEL 
(The British Model) 
 
ACTOR TRANSPORT  
COMPANIES 
REGIONAL 
AUTHORITY 
(RTA) 
 TRANSPORT  
COMPANIES 
 
TYPE PRIVATELY 
OWNED 
COMPANIES 
POLITICAL  
BODY 
REGIONAL 
TRANSPORT 
DEPARTMENT 
PRIVATELY 
 OWNED COMPANIES
 
RELATION IN 
COMPETITION 
ON THE FREE 
MARKET 
UNDER 
DEMOCRATIC 
CONTROL 
HIERARCHICALLY 
CONTROLLED BY 
THE POLITICAL 
BODY 
CONTRACT  
WITH RTA AFTER 
TENDERING 
 
MODE OF 
TRANSPORT 
ALL ALL  ALL 
 
STRATEGIC GENERAL  
AIMS 
TRANSPORT POLICY 
 
 
 AREA SOCIAL POLICY 
 
 
 TARGET 
GROUPS 
(DISCUSSION) STANDARDS OF 
ACCESSIBILITY 
 
 GENERAL 
PRODUCT 
FEATURES 
(DISCUSSION) (SOCIAL) 
STANDARDS  
OF MOBILITY 
 
TACTICAL FARES  FARES  
 ROUTES  ROUTES  
 TIMETABLE  (MIN. STANDARD) TIMETABLE 
 
 VEHICLE TYPE  (MIN. STANDARD) VEHICLE TYPE 
 
OPERATIONAL VEHICLE 
ROSTERING 
  VEHICLE  
ROSTERING 
 
 PERSONNEL 
ROSTERING 
  PERSONNEL  
ROSTERING 
 
 PERSONNEL  
MANAGEMENT 
  PERSONNEL  
MANAGEMENT 
 
 VEHICLE  
MAINTENANCE 
  VEHICLE  
MAINTENANCE 
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2.1.5 The positive and negative effects of each model 
1) The Scandinavian model 
 
Positive Effects: 
x Strong incentives to productive efficiency. 
x Service integration is easy to realise. 
 
Negative Effects: 
x Weak incentives to respond to passenger demand due to the absence of systematic 
competition at  the tactical level. 
x Danger for regulatory capture of the regional authority by the regional transport 
company. 
 
2) The French model 
 
Positive Effects: 
x Easy integration of services. 
x Easy transfer of personnel and installations. 
 
Negative Effects: 
x Limited incentives for productive efficiency. 
x No possibility for simultaneous  comparison of performances. 
x Huge tendering costs for bidders. 
x Danger for growing asymmetry of information. 
x Danger for an excessive orientation towards the private preferences of contract 
awarding politicians. 
 
3) The Adelaide Model 
 
Positive Effects: 
x Possibility to compare transporters’ performances simultaneously. 
x Small units can be tendered without loss of integration. 
x Incentives for both productive efficiency and demand responsiveness. 
 
Negative Effects: 
x Danger for excessive definition of minimum services by the authority. 
 
4) The British Model 
 
Positive Effects: 
x Direct response to market demand without authority intervention. 
x Clear separation of functions and focus of the authority  on the social aspects. 
x Possibility for several authorities to intervene simultaneously. 
x No or few border problems. 
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Negative Effects 
x Danger for the appearance of unfair competition (need for an adequate regulation 
of competitive practices) 
2.2 Principal-Agent Theory and Commercial Public Transport Services 
 
The Principal-agent (P-A) problem is: “... a situation in which a principal (or group of 
principals) seeks to establish incentives for an agent (or group of agents) who take 
decisions that effect the  principal, to act in ways that contribute maximally to the 
principal’s own objectives”.  (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
 
The P-A problem arises whenever a firm/organisation (whether private or public) is 
managed and owned by different sets of people with non converging objectives and 
the presence of asymmetric information.  The principal (the owner of the firm) wants 
to induce the agent (the firm’s manager) to act in his (the principal’s) interests, but 
because  of asymmetric information the agent is not fully informed about the 
circumstances and the behaviour of the agent.  There is a monitoring problem. 
 
Faced with this problem the crux of P-A theory is therefore what is the optimal 
incentive scheme for the principal to enforce for the agent?  For a full discussion of P-
A theory see Rees, 1985, for now the following discussion will suffice. 
 
There are two versions of the basic P-A model, the first assumes that the agent can 
observe the state of the world when choosing his actions  and the other assumes he 
can’t.  Both models have the following constructions: 
 
P -  is the utility function of the principal. ã  -  is the agent’s action. 
G -  is the utility function of the agent. Ø -  is the state of the world. 
 
The principal cannot  observe  either  ã  nor  Ø, but  is able to observe the outcome 
x(ã, Ø), the agent’s action given Ø, and makes his own action (payment to agent), 
denoted ý, a function of the observed outcome.   
 
Therefore the problem facing the principal is to choose ÿ(x), the incentive scheme for 
the agent.  He faces two constraints whilst choosing, firstly, that the agent will behave 
selfishly and secondly, the incentive scheme must be sufficiently attractive for the 
agent to participate. 
 
If the agent cannot observe Ø at the time of his actions then he will choose ã to 
maximise his expected utility given ÿ(x).  If the agent is risk neutral then the optimum 
incentive scheme takes a simple form with the principle receiving a ‘flat payment’ 
from the agent regardless or what occurs.  However, if the agent is risk averse then 
the principal must offer some insurance for bad states of the world.  This will dull the 
agent’s incentives, since he gains only part of the benefit resulting from extra effort 
on his part.  The agent may therefore use the asymmetry of information to reduce his 
overall effort. 
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If the agent can observe Ø before taking his action then the agent’s strategy given the 
incentive scheme ÿ(x) will then be a function of a(Ø) since the best action will depend 
upon circumstances.  As before, the principal must also ensure that the incentive 
arrangement is sufficiently attractive for the agent to want to take part in it.  The basic 
model can be applied to a wide variety of relationships but will vary in terms of the 
external constraints and pressures applied to both the principal and the agent.   
 
For an urban transport firm providing commercial services, the owners’ (the 
principals’) objective is to maximise their expected financial return (profit) from the 
company.  The principal’s problem, as outlined earlier, is to ensure that the optimal 
incentive scheme is in place to ensure that its agents (its managers and other 
employees) carry out this objective.   
 
P-A  theory suggests that the problem facing the principal is that the agents’ utility is 
likely to be a function, principally, of income and effort.  Other secondary variables 
might include the firm’s sales revenue, growth rate and the level of managerial 
discretion (all of which can be equated to power and prestige).  Given the presence of 
asymmetry of information, it is clear that the agents will have an incentive to pursue 
their own objectives at the expense of the principals. 
 
The theory however suggests that private firms are more effective in enforcing an 
optimal contract because they have a number of incentive mechanisms that do not 
exist for public firms.  In particular, these include: 
•  Shareholder Monitoring - Particularly when share ownership is concentrated. 
•  Take-over Constraint - Assuming that take-overs are triggered by a management 
team not maximising expected profits and not for other reasons, e.g. increasing a 
firm’s power or reducing a firm’s tax liabilities (King, 1986). 
•  Bankruptcy Constraint - Bankruptcy leads to the loss of control of a firm by the 
management and is akin to a take-over in that respect.  The tightness of the 
constraint will largely depend upon the differences between the maximised 
expected value of the firm’s debt level.  The effectiveness of the constraint 
increasing the lower the difference. 
 
Moreover, public firms are affected by: 
•  Politicians’ incentives - Primarily electoral success and secondary upon income, 
power, effort etc. 
•  Civil Servant’s Incentives - Based upon their department size, effort and prestige. 
 
At the extreme, where the firm is owner-managed the P-A problem should not exist.  
A case study of  a British bus firm  has been undertaken.  This firm was privatised in 
October 1988 as an Employee Share Ownership Programme in which eight senior 
managers held 51% of the shares and employees held 49%.  it was sold on to a stock 
exchange listed bus group (or plc - public limited company) in May 1994, see Figure 
2.2.1 for a diagrammatic relationship. 
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Figure 2.2.1 The Evolving P-A Relationships 
 
(1) Principal    Agent 
 
 Shareholders --------------------------- Managers 
 (Local Authority) 
 
(2) Principal    Agent 
 
 Shareholders --------------------------- Managers 
 (49% employees 
 & 51% management) 
 
(3) Principal    Agent 1   Agent 2 
 
 Shareholders ----------------------- Managers ---------------------- Managers 
 (Plc)     (Plc)    (Operator) 
 
Initially, there was a steady increase in operating profits rising from 4.5% of turnover 
in 1987-88, when still in public ownership, to 9.0% in 1990-91 (see Table 2.2.1).  
This however fell back to around 6% in 1992/3 and 1993/4 and may explain the take-
over of the company in 1994. Under the new owners (FirstBus)  profits are believed to 
have increased to a reported 15% in 1995-96. 
 
Whilst shareholding has become more dispersed, during the period under 
examination, the take-over constraint has tightened (under the ESOP any take-over 
required 68% of shareholders to agree), whilst under the ESOP it seems likely that 
both managers and employees will have had some non-profit related objectives, e.g. 
working conditions.  It certainly is evident that in Great Britain most ESOP’s have 
been relatively short lived, with there being strong incentives to sell due to favourable 
initial sale prices and inadequate claw back provisions (Wright et al., 1992).  This 
suggests that the P-A relationships in ESOPs and similar forms of management 
employee buy-outs may not be sustainable in a commercial environment.   
 
In conclusion, the case study could be said to support the initial suggestions that 
private firms are more effective in achieving the principal’s objective of maximising 
profit.  Whether they are quite so effective in optimising other criteria, such as social 
welfare, is possibly another matter. 
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TABLE 2.2.1:  FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE. 
 
Year 1987 
-88 
1988 
-89 
1989 
-90 
1990 
-91 
1992 
-93 
1993- 
94 
Ownership 
Type 
PTA ESOP ESOP ESOP ESOP ESOP 
Turnover £60 
million 
£30.1 
million 
£74.5 
million 
£83.3 
million 
£79.2 
million 
£80.0 
million 
Operating 
Profit 
£2.7 
million 
£1.6 
million 
£4.1 
million 
£7.5 
million 
£4.9 
million 
£5.0 
million 
Retained Profit £-1.1 
million 
£188,000 £177,000 £2.16 
million 
£4.5 
million 
£2.4 
million 
Op. Profit 
:Turnover 
0.045 0.053 0.055 0.090 0.062 0.063 
Acquisitions none 2 bus 
operators 
3 bus 
operators 
none none none 
2.3 Principal-agent theory and contracted public transport services 
 
Muren (1996) analyses three contractual forms: full cost (= minimum cost contracts), 
net cost (= minimum subsidy contracts) and contracts with measured service quality 
included as an explicit variable.  The objective is to minimise costs subject to a 
minimum level of service.  Using an analytical framework associated with Lewis and 
Sappington (1991) and Laffont and Tirole (1993), it is shown that  under the full cost 
contract the operator must make some profit even after a competitive bidding process, 
otherwise it would pay the operator to cut service quality.  By reducing the length of 
contract periods this profit, which is a transfer from the authority to the operator, can 
be reduced.  The net cost contract gives, in principle, a possibility to achieve the 
desired level of service quality with a lower profit accruing to the operator.  This is 
because the operating firm loses in two ways if it cuts quality of service: it will not get 
its contract renewed and it will lose fare revenues.  The net cost  contract thus gives 
the operator stronger incentives to produce quality of service.  However, if there is 
high variation in the number of passengers, the net cost contract may require 
compensating the operator for taking the risk.  Such compensation reduces the relative 
advantage of the net cost contract over the full cost contract.  The incentive contract 
with quality made explicit in the contract resembles the net cost contract in that it is 
risky for the operator.  These contracts may be useful to the extent that it is possible to 
find variables that are easy to measure and for which the operator can predict the 
effect of investment in service quality with relative certainty. 
 
Another important area of theoretical study is the application of auction theory  to 
explain bidding strategies (see Kennedy, 1995 for a useful summary).  In particular, at 
least two types of auctions are possible.  Independent value auctions occur where 
bidders have different valuations for the good being auctioned.  For example, a bus  
company will require lower amounts of subsidy if the contract fits in well with 
existing work or can be easily served from an existing depot compared to a bidder for  
 
 
 23 
 
whom these characteristics do not apply.  In such a case, the bid will increase (i.e. the 
amount of subsidy will decrease) as the number of bidders increases.  Common value 
auctions occur where all bidders have the same valuation of the good being auctioned 
but are uncertain about the value of that good.  In such auctions, they may increase 
their bids as the number of bidders increases in order to win the auction but if they do 
this they may run the risk of the winner's curse.  In other words, they may over-
estimate the value of the good being auctioned and pay more for it than it is worth.  
To avoid the winner's curse, bidders may be particularly cautious when there are a 
large number of bidders.  The two effects cancel out and in a common value auction 
bid price is not expected to vary  with the number of bidders.  It may be expected that 
revenue from a given bus service with fixed fares would have a common value for 
bidders. 
 
A number of other aspects of auction theory may be worth considering.  Vickrey 
auctions award contracts to the highest bidder based on the price of the second highest 
bidder.  This is believed to reduce strategic bidding and could have a role in public 
transport.  A two stage bidding process with separate bids based on price and quality 
could be considered (referred to in the literature as the Brook's Law procedure).  
Menu auctions are also possible, whereby, for example,  bidders make bids for routes 
separately and in various combinations.  This enables bidders to exploit economies of  
scope but also allows scope for strategic behaviour. 
2.4 The role of the public and private sector 
 
Jansson (1994a) highlights four main arguments for public intervention in public 
transport. 
 
(i) The user economies of scale argument for a single route which is associated 
with Mohring (1972) and arises because as usage of public transport increases 
so will the benefits to existing users through increased frequencies and greater 
network density. 
 
(ii) The intra-marginal demand argument.  Private operators will invest, at the 
margin, where profits are highest.  Investments will be concentrated on elastic 
markets and, except in cases of perfect price discrimination, will reject 
investments in inelastic markets where the main benefit will be to existing 
users. 
 
(iii) The user economies of scale argument for a network.  There may be a number 
of benefits of operating an integrated network (Cottham, 1986).  The main 
effect is that the frequency and price of one route will effect the frequency and 
price and hence user benefits on rival (competing and complementary) routes. 
This will need to be taken into account if the objective is to maximise net 
economic benefit (i.e. benefit to producers, consumers and society as a whole). 
 
 
 
 24 
 
(iv) The second-best argument for public intervention.  This is the most common 
argument for public intervention and states that where car and public transport 
are competing modes (i.e. substitutes), if car is priced below marginal social 
cost then public transport should also be priced below marginal social costs. 
The first best solution is, of course, to ensure that car covers its marginal 
social cost. 
 
These four features provide an argument for public intervention in terms of financial 
support, but not necessarily in terms of public planning and operation.  Gwilliam 
(1987) lists a number of other reasons including operator economies of scale, public 
good characteristics, merit good characteristics and information imperfections. 
 
Jansson analyses the first three of these effects for a single corridor which initially 
consists of one operator providing a service along the corridor’s entire length.  
Subsequently, a second operator enters the market but only supplies services on the 
corridor's inner section (this may be thought of as a form of cream skimming).  The 
analysis assumes that the market is otherwise protected from both actual and potential 
competition.  His simulation results are presented in Table 2.4.1.  This analysis 
indicates that welfare maximisation without a budget constraint is the optimal result, 
but this assumes lump-sum subsidy.  If the shadow price of public funds is greater 
than 1.21 (and there is some evidence to suggest that this is the case), then welfare 
maximisation subject to a break-even constraint is the optimal policy.  Compared to 
this policy, profit maximisation by one operator leads to a 150% increase in fares, a 
33% decrease in service levels and a 37% decrease in net social benefit.  Where a 
second operator enters on part of the route, net social benefit reduces by a further 
17%.  This is because those travelling along the entire length of the route disbenefit 
from the reduced frequency offered by the incumbent (an example of the Mohring 
effect in reverse). 
 
TABLE 2.4.1:  PRIVATE V PUBLIC SECTOR ANALYSIS : SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
  Price 
per km 
Frequency Demand Consumer 
Surplus 
Producer 
Surplus 
Net Social 
Benefit 
1 Welfare maximisation 
/one operator 
No budget constraint 
0 6.3 792 7920 -2520 5400 
2 Welfare maximisation 
/one operator 
Break-even constraint 
4 4.9 486 4860 0 4860 
3 Profit maximisation 
/one operator 
10 3.3 218 2180 860 3040 
4 Profit maximisation 
/two operators 
   
 Incumbent 10 2.6 158 
 Entrant 10 2.3 50 
 Total 10 208 2002 510 2512 
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TABLE 2.4.2:  STRENGTHS OF ARGUMENT AGAINST PRIVATE SECTOR 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 Local and Regional 
Transport 
Long-distance Transport 
User Economies of Scale Strong Weak 
Intra-Marginal Demand Strong Strong 
Network Effects Strong Strong/Weak 
Second-Best Effects Strong Weak 
 
Jansson goes on to consider the role of these effects for local and regional public 
transport on the one hand and long-distance public transport on the other.  His 
findings are summarised in Table 2.4.2.  It is concluded that the free market solution 
in the public transport sector will not imply optimal solutions.  The arguments for 
public sector involvement are, however, greater for urban and regional transport than 
long-distance transport.  Furthermore, the user economy of scale arguments will be 
strongest for urban, regular services where passengers turn up at stops at random 
rather than use timetables (see also Jansson, 1993 and Tisato, 1995).  Similarly, 
network effects and second-best effects are likely to be greatest in urban areas with 
their denser public transport networks and greater levels of road congestion, accidents 
and pollution.  Furthermore, intra-marginal effects may be weaker in those long 
distance sectors where price discrimination is practised (e.g. airlines, railways). 
 
Although the analysis suggests that free markets are not optimal i.e. that private sector 
responsibility is limited, it does not prove that the public sector is necessarily more 
efficient.  Particular problems relate to inappropriate public choices concerning 
investments, prices and frequencies which may lead to inefficiencies in consumption 
(see, for example, Nilsson, 1991) and the lack of incentives for both planners and 
operators which may lead to inefficiencies in production (see, for example, Kim and 
Spiegel, 1987).  Given the short-comings of both total public and total private 
responsibility for public transport, particularly in urban areas, it is recommended that 
competitive tendering may be beneficial. 
 
Jansson (1996) extends his analysis to assess the impact of first best pricing for 
private transport (through introducing road pricing).  From a case study of Stockholm, 
he concludes that the current second best prices for both public and private transport 
result in higher than optimal levels of congestion, accidents and environmental 
degradation,  lower than optimal public transport services (and lower than optimal 
prices) and an excess burden on the economy due to the large amounts  of subsidy 
required.   Introducing a first best policy of central area road pricing, public transport 
fare increases and service improvements leads to net benefits of almost SEK900m  
(around 125m ECUs) per annum.  The main gainers are taxpayers, the economy as a 
whole (through reduced externalities and excess burden), business motorists, bus 
users within the inner city and lorries.   The main losers are private motorists and 
public transport users to and from the inner city.   The implication of this work is that 
some form of public control may be required for both public and private transport, at 
least in terms of finances. 
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2.5 Competition - simulation models 
 
2.5.1 Stockholm - Arlanda airport 
 
In this section  competition between public and private operators on the link between 
Stockholm city and the Arlanda airport is discussed. The purpose of this case study is 
to study competition between different operators.  
 
In Sweden the state railway has been divided into a railtrack authority (Banverket) 
and an operating state monopoly, Statens Järnvägar (SJ). Since 1 July 1996, there is 
free competition on the rail network for goods transport, but passenger transport 
services are  still monopolised for long distance services. The line Central Stockholm-
Arlanda airport which will be operated from 1999 is the only long distance service 
line with competition for SJ. The distance between the city terminal in central 
Stockholm and Arlanda airport is approximately 40 km. The city terminal is where the 
national rail lines, many long distance coaches and local buses, underground lines and 
meet. 
 
The purpose of the study is thus to analyse competition between a) ordinary 
(subsidised) public transport service, that is the regional public transport authority 
Stockholm Transport’s (SL) network of commuter trains, underground and buses, b) 
airport shuttle buses operated by Flygbussarna AB, a ”company” owned by SL, c) 
commercial state owned Swedish State Railways (SJ) services and d) commercial 
private train services (A-train). Consequences are described in terms of user benefits 
and losses, producer gains or losses plus external effects. Specifically it is of interest 
to consider the incidence for business travellers and private travellers respectively. 
 
In 1995 about 3.4 million trips were made on the Arlanda shuttle buses (including 
working trips)  of which 2 million refer to the bus from the city terminal. Some 
companies at the airport subsidise their employees for use of the airport shuttle to get 
to/from work, implying that about 400 000 trips on the shuttle buses are works trips. 
In this analysis we do not consider these trips, since the magnitude of them and the 
choice of mode depends on the employers policy. According to existing forecasts, in 
2005 about 6,6 million long-distance travellers will travel by public transport to 
Arlanda airport, thereof 67% are business travellers and 33% private travellers. About 
12,8 million travellers use taxi or private cars. We assume fixed public transport 
demand. 
 
The values of time used are recommended by the Swedish Institute for Transport and 
Communications Analysis, SIKA, for national infrastructure planning. Business 
travellers are assumed to have the value of time (VOT) 140 SEK/hour. Private 
travellers are assumed to have the value 70 SEK/hour. Note that the fairly high value 
refers to long-distance travel, which is used here, assuming that passengers value time 
the same for the long-distance part of the journey as for the access to the airport. 
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In the case Base_B passengers going to Arlanda airport can choose between two 
public transport alternatives: the shuttle airport buses and SL’s local network with 
commuter trains connected to a local bus to Arlanda. The travel time between the 
Central station and the airport is about 60 minutes using the SL network and 40 
minutes going by airport shuttle bus. The number of departures is adjusted to the 
increased demand (compared to the frequency today). It may be that the current 
pricing policy of Flygbussarna AB is not optimal from a welfare point of view. Case 
Base_Bm (for Base modified) thus assumes that the pricing policy of the city-Arlanda 
bus is changed so that total revenue exceeds total cost by some 10%. Even though this 
price structure may not be optimal, it is probably closer to the optimum than the 
current situation. In the analysis changes are related to the two base cases. 
 
From 1999 there will be competition from the private consortium operating a shuttle 
train (called A-train) between the Central station in Stockholm and Arlanda airport. 
The travel time between the Central station and the airport will be approximately 20 
minutes and the trains are assumed to run every 15 minutes. This case is called case 
BA (for Bus and A-train). Case BrA (for Bus reduced and A-train) assumes that the 
frequency for the bus service from the city terminal are reduced by 42%, due to lower 
demand. 
 
It is expected that the private railway A-train  will enjoy competition from the 
Swedish State Railways (SJ). This situation will be simulated in case BAS (Bus, A-
train and SJ-trains). Compared to the A-train the SJ services would have the 
advantage  to be connected to the national railway system. There have been 
discussions on whether the shuttle bus service should be allowed to compete with A-
train and SJ-trains from the city terminal. For this reason a situation is simulated 
where the shuttle bus services from the city terminal are abandoned. This case is 
called it is considered BaAS (for Bus abandoned, A-train and SJ-trains). 
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TABLE 2.5.1:  CASES 
 
Case Operator Dep. per h time (min) Fare (SEK) 
     
Base_B SL commuter train and bus  4 60 10 per route 
 
Bus city-Arlanda 12 40 60 
 
    
Base_m SL commuter train and bus  4 60 10 per route 
 
Bus city-Arlanda 12 40 35 
 
    
BA  SL commuter train and bus 4 60 10 per route 
 
Bus city-Arlanda 12 40 60 
 
A-train city-Arlanda 4 20 90 
 
    
BrA SL commuter train and bus 4 60 10 per route 
 
Bus city-Arlanda 6 40 60 
 
A-train city-Arlanda 4 20 90 
 
    
BAS SL commuter train and bus 4 60 10 per route 
 
Bus city-Arlanda 12 40 60 
 
A-train city-Arlanda 4 20 90 
 
SJ train Central station-
Arlanda 
1 22 1 class 90, 2 class 60 
 
SJ train Södertälje-Arlanda 3 22 1 class 195, 2 class 120 
 
    
BaAS SL commuter train and bus 4 60 10 per route 
 
A-train city-Arlanda 4 20 90 
 
SJ train Central station-
Arlanda 
1 22 1 class 90, 2 class 60 
 SJ train Södertälje-Arlanda 3 22 1 class 195, 2 class 120 
 
Table 2.5.1 summarises the cases, with number of departures and riding time and fares 
from the city terminal in Stockholm to Arlanda. Generally the full prices for business 
trips are reduced with respect to VAT (12%) and another 30% to take into account 
discounts and the companies’ profits due to improved transport services, implying that 
prices are reduced by 38%: 
x The average fare paid by private travellers using SL’s public transport services is 
SEK 10 per route. For business trips the price after tax deduction is SEK 6.2 per 
route used. 
x According to existing information  the A-train fare is assumed to be SEK 90, 
including VAT 12 % for private travellers. For business trips the price after 38% 
tax deduction is SEK 55. 
x The above mentioned extra fee of  SEK 15 for the passengers going to/from 
Arlanda to the private consortium has been taken into account. 
 
The costs per vehicle kilometre for the airport buses are assumed to be SEK 
20/vehicle km. The operating costs for the A-train and the SJ-train include 
infrastructure user fees  
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of SEK 6.4 per train kilometre based on 200 seats. The investment costs for the track 
funded by the Swedish National Rail Administration (Banverket) are SEK 2 000  
million excluding. VAT. Since social costs shall be valued at consumer prices average 
indirect tax of 23% is added. The annual cost is then SEK 108 million per year 
assuming 60 years life length and a 4% real interest. The investment costs of SEK 1 
000 million for the terminal  at the airport are  shared between the operators. These 
costs are joint costs (SEK 54 million per year) occur irrespective of whether A-train, 
SJ-trains or both use the terminal. It is assumed that the passengers who use SJ 
services to/from the Arlanda airport have to pay a fee of SEK 15 per passenger to the 
private Arlanda shuttle train consortium to cover the investment costs for the Arlanda 
train terminal. 
 
The external costs for air pollution, exhaust gases, accidents and road maintenance, as 
recommended by the Swedish Institute for Transport and Communications Analysis 
(SIKA) are used in the calculations. The total external costs for the different modes 
are: bus 3,59 SEK/vehicle km  per bus, train (four carriages assumed) 0,20 
SEK/vehicle km and private car  0,64 SEK/vehicle km. It is assumed that the state 
receives SEK 0,37 less taxes per (unleaded) car kilometre when travellers shift from 
private car to public transport and car. 1,3 passengers per car are assumed. 
 
In the base situation  (Base_B) the airport shuttle bus from the city terminal is the 
most important mode. It is used for 78% of the  6,6 million trips (5,1 million trips) in 
2005. The percentage increases to 82% when the fare for the airport shuttle bus is 
decreased from  60 SEK to 35 SEK (in Base_m). Only about 0,5 million travellers use 
the airport  shuttle buses going from other places in Stockholm. When the A-train  is 
introduced (case BA) the airport shuttle bus going between the Central station and 
Arlanda are looses about over 3 million passengers of their 5,1 million passengers. (in 
case B). This is due to the fact that  75% of the business travellers go by A-train to 
Arlanda. Only 1% of the private travellers  choose the A-train.  
 
When the airport buses reduce the frequency of the  airport  shuttle bus from 12 to 6 
departures per hour and direction (in case BrA), 14% of the private travellers use the 
A-train. The number of trips performed on the local SL network to Arlanda is 
relatively constant in all cases. More than half of the private travellers  and 30% of the 
business travellers go by SJ when their trains services are  introduced (in case BAS). 
50% of the business people stay on the A-train. If the airport shuttle does no longer 
have access to the city  terminal (in case BaAS), nearly  three quarters of the private 
travellers  choose the SJ-train.    
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TABLE 2.5.2:  TRIPS PER YEAR (2005) BY OPERATOR  
 
Trips total Base_B Base_m BA BrA BAS BaAS 
Bus city  5 179 942 5 442 103 2 017 511 1 329 054 1 043 511 0 
Bus other 502 050 521 515 402 764 302 491 365 281 332 006 
SL 921 767 640 141 715 423 928 139 408 264 411 303 
A-train 0 0 3 468 061 4 044 075 2 289 419 2 848 598 
SJ-train 0 0 0 0 2 497 284 3 011 852 
Total 6 603 759 6 603 759 6 603 759 6 603 759 6 603 759 6 603 759 
 
The business travellers benefit most from the introduction of A-train to Arlanda. This 
is due to their high value of time  (140  SEK/h compared to 70 SEK/h)  and due the 
fact that business people make two thirds of all travellers. The average weighted time 
for the business trips decreases by 4 % or SEK 10 when the A-train is introduced 
(compared to case B). For the private travellers the introduction does not mean an 
improvement in generalised costs at all.  
 
Both business and private travellers are best off in case BAS when both A-train and 
SJ-trains are operated. The private travellers can improve their average weighted time 
by 16%, while the weighted time for the business people is reduced by 10%. The 
differences are slightly smaller when comparing case BaAS where the airport shuttle 
bus is no longer allowed to go to/from the city terminal with case B. When using 
Base_Bm as base case (where the shuttle bus fare is nearly halved) only the cases 
BAS and BrAS where the two rail operators offer their services are experienced as 
service improvements.  
 
TABLE 2.5.3:  CONSUMER SURPLUS IN SEK PER YEAR 
 
 private business total 
Base_m  -Base_B 35 67 102 
BA -      -Base_B 0 47 48 
BrA       -Base_B -8 38 30 
BAS      -Base_B 54 114 168 
BaAS     -Base_B 52 103 155 
 
   
BA        -Base_m -34 -20 -54 
BrA       -Base_m -43 -29 -72 
BAS      -Base_m 20 46 66 
BaAS     -Base_m 17 36 53 
 
The overall revenues are highest in case BAS when airport shuttle bus, A-train and 
SJ-trains are offering their services (+47% compared to case B).  In this situation the 
Flygbussarna reduced their revenues by about 80%. Taking into account also the 
operating costs including infrastructure user fees the following development for the 
producer surplus can be expected.  
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TABLE 2.5.4:  OPERATORS’ PRODUCER SURPLUS (INCL. TERMINAL INVESTMENTS) 
IN SEK PER YEAR 
 
 Bus city A-train SJ-train total 
Base_m  -Base_B -92 0 0 -92 
BA -      -Base_B -138 19 0 -120 
BrA       -Base_B -108 60 0 -48 
BAS      -Base_B -63 33 -43 -74 
BaAS     -Base_B -113 30 -22 -105 
 
In terms of operators’ surplus best results are achieved when the airport buses, A-train 
and SJ offer their services. The surplus is larger compared to the modified base with 
reduced fares for the airport buses (Base_m) than compared to the situation today 
(Base_B). The losses are caused by the assumption of fixed demand. If the amount of 
travellers increase with 15% which is probably realistic the operators could cover 
their costs. SJ’s bad result is due to the assumption that SJ has to pay 15 SEK per 
passenger have to the A-train consortium to cover the terminal investment costs.   
 
The monetary value for the external costs is about SEK 22 million per year for the 
airport shuttle buses  leaving every five minutes to/from Arlanda and SEK 0,5 million 
for the A-train or SJ-trains  leaving four times per hour. Compared to the actual 
situation with only buss services to Arlanda the external costs are halved ( SEK 11 
million per year) when the number of bus departures is halved in case BrAS. The 
external costs are lowest in case BaAS where both trains are operating and the airport 
buses are abandoned from the city terminal. 
 
In the cases with trains operating the investment costs of SEK 2000 million for the 
track funded by the state - the Swedish National Rail Administration (Banverket) are 
included. The costs per year are SEK 108 million assuming 60 years life length and a 
4% real interest. The total welfare includes consumer and producer surplus, state 
surplus and external costs. When comparing the two base cases, the total welfare is 
slightly higher in case Base_m (+ SEK 10 million). This is due to the fact that trips 
are transferred from the local SL-network to the airport buses.  
 
TABLE 2.5.5:  TOTAL WELFARE (IN SEK PER YEAR)  
 
 
 
Consumer  
surplus 
Producer
surplus  
State 
surplus 
External
 effects 
Total 
welfare 
Base_m  -Base_B 102 -92 0 0 10 
BA -      -Base_B 48 -120 -108 0 -180 
BrA       -Base_B 30 -48 -108 11 -115 
BAS      -Base_B 168 -74 -108 -1 -15 
BaAS     -Base_B 155 -105 -108 21 -37 
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Taking into account consumers and producers benefits and losses, the external costs 
and the state’s track investment costs the total welfare worsens compared to the actual 
situation with the airport buses and the SL-network in all cases. The introduction of 
the A-train and the SJ-train is the case that  means the smallest change in terms of 
total welfare (- SEK 15 million). This is caused by the annual investment costs of 
SEK 108 million and the operators’ losses.  
 
2.5.2 Manchester 
A 216 zone model based on the hierarchical logit model has been developed to 
determine the impact of extending the Metrolink (tram system) in Manchester 
(Halcrow Fox, 1996A). Table 2.5.6 carries out some sensitivity analysis using this 
model.  The results indicate that LRT (i.e. Metrolink demand) is less sensitive to fare 
and service quality charges than bus demand but increased bus competition can lead 
to significant reductions in LRT revenue.  Table 2.5.6 also indicates the importance of 
trade-offs between producers and consumers.  The success of the Manchester 
Metrolink scheme does though illustrate once again that there may be scope for 
increasing welfare through introducing new competitive services, particularly if the 
market is heterogeneous enough to permit product differentiation (see, for example, 
Preston, 1993). 
 
Four further scenarios were tested as follows: 
 
1. An integrated public transport system with a flat fare that operates throughout the 
network (as in Brussels); 
2. An integrated structure but with a distance related fare structure based on zones (as 
in Rotterdam); 
3. A network in which frequencies are doubled but route km held constant; and  
4. A network in which frequencies are held constant but route km are doubled. 
 
Their results are given by Table 2.5.7.  It can be seen that integration of services 
provides benefits in terms of making public transport more attractive   relative to car 
based travel, in particular by lowering fares, with public transport demand increasing 
by between 8% and 11%, whilst fares are reduced by between 17% and 33%.  
However, this leads to reductions in revenue of between 11% and 27% and therefore 
these policies are not commercially viable.  Increasing frequencies  and/or network 
coverage boosts patronage significantly (by between 9% and 22% ) but never by an 
amount whereby the increases in revenue offsets the increases in operating costs.  
These policies are therefore not commercially viable either.  The main conclusion to 
come from this analysis is that there is no "golden rule" for increasing the fortunes of 
urban public transport.  All the scenarios tested involve trading off one aspect of 
public transport against another - for example, reduced subsidy usually implies higher 
fares and lower market share.  However, this analysis does make the nature of the 
trade-offs explicit, thus allowing the policy maker to have a clearer idea of the choices 
that they may have available to them. 
 
In the final three rows of Table 2.5.7, we have made some very crude estimates of 
changes in welfare, based on the assumption of linear demand curves and that in the 
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base case operations are breaking-even. The percentages in these rows refer to total 
revenue. Thus in the flat fare scenario producer surplus reduces by 27% of total 
revenue, whilst consumer surplus increases by 35% of total revenue.  Thus society is 
better off by an amount equal to 8% of total revenue, assuming that there are no 
external costs and benefits.  In reality there may be some external benefits in terms of 
reduced congestion, accidents and environmental pollution, although these are likely 
to be relatively small. However, this assumes 11% increase in traffic can be carried 
with a zero increase in operating costs.  In reality an increase in operating costs would 
be expected that would  eradicate most if not all of the welfare gain.  A similar 
situation exists with the distance related fare, although here society is only better off 
by an amount equivalent to 7% of total revenue, with patronage only increasing by 
8%.  By contrast doubling frequency is welfare inefficient, leading to a reduction 
equivalent to 28% of total revenue.  Doubling network coverage, is  more welfare 
efficient with an increase equivalent to 9% of total revenue.  However, this would 
also imply substantial increases in capital costs as the LRT network would need to be 
doubled.  In simplistic terms, the above suggests that price reductions in Manchester 
might lead to improvements in welfare but that service increases would not lead to 
improvements.  This may in turn indicate that in Manchester fares and frequencies are 
too high: a price:output combination that is believed to be typical of many competed 
markets (see, for example, Evans, 1987).   
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TABLE 2.5.6:  MANCHESTER INITIAL MODEL TEST RESULTS 
 
Change in Output Bus fare 
down 
50% 
Bus wait 
time 
down 
50% 
Bus 
interchan
ge time 
down 
50% 
LRT 
fare 
down 
50% 
LRT 
feeder 
fare down 
50% 
LRT 
wait 
time 
down 
50% 
LRT 
interchan
ge time 
down 
50% 
All 
down 
50% 
All fares 
down 
50% 
Flat 
PT 
fares 
Bus passenger kms 
LRT passenger kms 
Total PT Passenger kms 
Bus revenues 
79.4% 
-11.3% 
3.0% 
-12.3% 
65.7% 
-8.7% 
3.0% 
28.3% 
4.2% 
-0.6% 
0.2% 
2.1% 
-36.4% 
17.8% 
9.2% 
-7.6% 
-12.8% 
4.5% 
1.8% 
-28.4% 
-31.3% 
13.4% 
6.4% 
-5.3% 
-11.9% 
4.3% 
1.8% 
-1.0% 
13.9% 
23.7% 
22.2% 
-34.7% 
0.4% 
15.0% 
12.7% 
-44.0% 
40.6% 
-7.2% 
0.4% 
8.8% 
LRT revenues 
Total PT Revenues 
PT mode share (number % points) 
-11.3% 
-11.6% 
1.8% 
-8.5% 
1.4% 
1.9% 
-0.6% 
0.2% 
0.1% 
-40.3% 
-31.5% 
4.2% 
4.3% 
-4.6% 
0.7% 
14.1% 
8.8% 
3.0% 
4.2% 
2.8% 
0.7% 
-37.2% 
-36.5% 
11.1% 
-41.8% 
-42.4% 
6.0% 
-
10.2% 
-5.0% 
-0.7% 
Consumer surplus for existing bus users 
(mins) 
Consumer surplus for existing LRT 
users (mins) 
Bus revenue per passenger km 
LRT revenue per passenger km 
6.7 
 
- 
 
-51.1% 
0.0% 
6.4 
 
- 
 
-22.5% 
0.2% 
0.4 
 
- 
 
-2.0% 
0.0% 
- 
 
9.8 
 
45.3% 
-49.3% 
- 
 
1.8 
 
-17.9% 
-0.3% 
- 
 
6.3 
 
37.8% 
0.6% 
- 
 
1.8 
 
12.3% 
-0.1% 
13.4 
 
19.8 
 
-42.7% 
-49.2% 
6.7 
 
11.6 
 
-44.3% 
-49.4% 
0.0 
 
0.1 
 
-22.% 
-3.2% 
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TABLE 2.5.7:  FINAL MANCHESTER MODEL TESTS 
 
 Integrated PT and  
Flat Fare 
Integrated PT and  
Distance Related 
Fare 
Doubling of Service  
Frequency 
Doubling of Network 
Coverage 
Bus Passenger Kms 
LRT Passenger Kms 
TOTAL PASSENGER Kms 
Bus Revenue 
LRT Revenue 
TOTAL REVENUE 
Bus Operating Costs 
LRT Operating Costs 
TOTAL OPERATING COST 
Bus operating subsidy 
LRT operating subsidy 
TOTAL SUBSIDY 
PT MODE SHARE 
Change in Producer  
Surplus 
Change in Consumer  
Surplus 
CHANGE IN WELFARE 
-8.7% 
+14.2% 
+10.6% 
-2.7% 
-35.5% 
-26.6% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
+0.3% 
+5.7% 
+4.0% 
+4.2% 
 
-26.6% 
 
+34.9% 
 
+8.3% 
-13.4% 
+11.4% 
+7.5% 
-15.8% 
-9.4% 
-11.1% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
0.0% 
+2.0% 
+1.5% 
+1.7% 
+3.5% 
 
-11.1% 
 
+17.9% 
 
+6.8% 
+18.2% 
+6.7% 
+8.6% 
+16.2% 
+7.4% 
+9.8% 
+50.0% 
+50.0% 
+50.0% 
+30.7% 
+31.9% 
+31.5% 
+4.4% 
 
-40.2% 
 
+11.9% 
 
-28.3% 
-33.5% 
+32.4% 
+22.0% 
-2.0% 
+34.4% 
+24.5% 
+50.0% 
+50.0% 
+50.0% 
+31.8% 
+29.8% 
+30.4% 
+11.7% 
 
-25.5% 
 
+34.3% 
 
+8.8% 
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CHAPTER 3 
Empirical Results 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
3.1 Partial factor productivity and cost efficiency indices 
 
Following the work of Mackie and Nash (1982) a series of indicators have been 
developed for urban  public transport operations in Europe.  The analysis was based 
on the ISOTOPE database developed by Work Package 1.  Although this database is 
relatively comprehensive for bus it is less so for rail modes.  Similarly, although 
coverage is good for some countries e.g. Spain and Sweden  it is less so for others. 
Furthermore, the data affected by a number of outliers, which have had to be 
excluded. 
 
Due to reasons of commercial confidentiality, the results are aggregated by 
geographic area and are presented in Table 3.1.1 for bus and Table 3.1.2 for rail-based 
modes (LRT/Tram, Underground and Suburban Rail). The results for bus are 
described below.  It should be noted that our data has been aggregated to a city level 
with a number of cities having a number of operators.  There are a maximum of 34 
cities in our  bus database: 
 •  The average cost:recovery ratio is 0.51, with the highest results for the British Isles 
and Spain (somewhat surprisingly) and the lowest measures for Italy/Greece, 
France and the Benelux countries.  This ratio may be thought of as the main 
financial productivity measure. 
•  The average revenue per passenger kilometre is 0.074 ECUs (at market exchange 
rates).  France and the Nordic countries have the highest average revenues at 
around 0.154 ECUs, with Spain the lowest at around 0.035 ECUs. 
•  The average loading figure is 22 passengers.  The loading for Spain is double this 
at around 48 passengers, high figures can also be seen  for both Portugal and 
Italy/Greece.  The lowest figure is that posted for the Nordic Countries at around 
10 passengers.  This measure may be thought of as a measure of commercial 
productivity but is likely to be affected by population density, car ownership etc. 
•  The average cost per passenger km is 0.24 ECUs and is highest for France and the 
Nordic countries and lowest for Portugal, Spain and the British Isles at 0.1 or less. 
•  The average staff costs are 29,437 ECUs per full time employee, with the highest 
wage/salaries being earned in the Benelux countries and the lowest in Spain. 
•  On average the non staff costs per vehicle km are 1.28 ECUs, with the highest 
costs being recorded for Germany and the Nordic countries and the lowest for 
Spain and the Benelux countries. 
•  Revenue per vehicle km averages 1.28 ECUs and is highest for France and is 
lowest for the Nordic countries. 
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•  Total cost per vehicle km averages 2.24 ECUs and is highest for Germany and 
Italy/Greece but lowest for the British Isles and the Nordic countries. 
•  Lastly, vehicle kilometres per member of staff, which is a measure of staff 
productivity, averages 17,336 per annum, being highest for the Nordic countries 
and lowest for Spain. 
 
TABLE 3.1.1:  PRODUCTIVITY INDICATORS - BUS 
 
Country  R R PK TC SC NSC R TC VK 
  TC PK VK PK SN VK VK VK SN 
Benelux M 0.277 0.046 16.1 0.17 47990 0.53 0.8 2.94 19999 
 
SD 0.117 0.017 2.35 0.017 8826 0.29 0.34 0.27 2634 
 
Ob 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 
France M 0.253 0.151 14.0 0.68 31491 1.26 1.9 2.8 17351 
 
SD 0.179 0.144 6.71 0.925 4143 0.47 2.6 0.97 2817 
 
Ob 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 
Germany M 0.332 0.083 16.4 0.25 37121 1.84 1.30 3.95 17382 
& Austria SD 0.107 0.045 2.95 0.08 11072 0.79 0.53 1.07 4061 
 
Ob 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Italy & 
Greece 
M 0.3 0.04 22.9 0.16 34344 1.38 0.9 3.43 16036 
 
SD 0.072 0.01 2.49 0.06 16088 0.30 0.11 0.11 4633 
 
Ob 3 4 5 3 3 3 4 4 3 
Portugal M 0.61 0.053 32.1 0.086 27009 0.97 1.6 2.65 15802 
 
SD 0.029 0.006 4.68 0.007 0 0 0.22 0.22 819 
 
Ob 4 4 3 4 1 1 3 3 3 
Nordic M 0.686 0.154 9.7 0.47 28209 1.93 0.78 1.71 21415 
 
SD .0 0.017 5.06 0.27 7016 0.9 0.5 0.16 20440 
 
Ob 1 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 
Spain M 0.831 0.035 47.5 0.043 12833 0.82 1.54 1.86 12714 
 
SD 0.072 0.015 9.69 0.02 775 0.31 0.29 0.38 2454 
 
Ob 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
British Isles M 0.85 0.077 16.7 0.1 16500 1.43 1.42 1.44 17987 
 
SD 0.09 0.006 4.74 0.02 4506 0.87 0.31 0.14 3503 
 
Ob 2 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Average  0.51 0.08 22 0.24 29437 1.27 1.28 2.6 17336 
 
Key: R  = Revenue per annum (ECUs) PK  = Passenger kms per  
       annum 
 SC = Staff costs per annum (ECUs) NSC = Non Staff Costs per  
       annum 
 na =  None available   TC = Total Costs per annum  
       (ECUs) 
 VK =  Vehicle kms per annum   SN = Staff Numbers 
 M  = Mean average    Ob = Observations 
 SD =  Standard Deviation 
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TABLE 3.1.2:  PRODUCTIVITY INDICATORS - RAIL BASED MODES 
 
Country  R R PK TC SC NSC R TC VK 
  TC PK VK PK SN VK VK VK SN 
Benelux M 0.249 0.071 24.7 0.545 39792 9.05 2.7 12.2 12743 
 
SD 0.031 0 15.4 0.219 0 1.34 0.2 1.8 9877 
 
Ob 2 1 4 1 1 2 2 3 2 
France M na na 68.3 na na na na na 3097 
 
SD na na 37.3 na na na na na 0 
 
Ob na na 4 na na na na na 1 
Germany M 0.3 0.055 20.3 0.199 36819 3.14 1.61 5.23 22795 
& Austria SD 0.12 0.028 3.98 0.093 7766 2.17 1.07 2.42 8658 
 
Ob 7 7 9 9 8 7 8 8 8 
Italy & 
Greece 
M 0.192 0.319 50.0 1.667 na 2.39 1.22 4.97 na 
 
SD 0 0 47.0 0 na 0 0.26 0 na 
 
Ob 1 1 2 1 na 1 2 1 na 
Portugal M 0.431 0.015 71.5 0.035 27995 na 1.40 3.25 15171 
 
SD 0 0 14.4 0 0 na 0 0 0 
 
Ob 1 1 3 1 1 na 1 1 1 
Nordic M 0.616 0.092 12.2 0.145 28631 0.24 1.41 2.11 10487 
 
SD 0.067 0.039 7.1 0.048 1694 0 1.14 1.63 0 
 
Ob 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 
Spain M 0.190 0.012 55 na na na 1.27 na 8005 
 
SD 0 0.011 0 na na na 0 na 0 
 
Ob 1 2 1 na na na 1 na 1 
British Isles M 0.61 0.21 18.6 0.23 34582 11.7 3.33 17.1 6392 
 
SD 0 0 9.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Ob 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Average  0.37 0.111 40.1 0.47 33564 5.3 1.85 7.48 11241 
 
Key: R  = Revenue per annum (ECUs) PK  = Passenger kms per  
       annum 
 SC = Staff costs per annum (ECUs) NSC = Non Staff Costs per  
       annum    
 na =  None available   TC = Total Costs per annum  
       (ECUs) 
 VK =  Vehicle kms per annum   SN = Staff Numbers 
 M  = Mean average   SD = Standard Deviation 
 Ob = Observations 
 
The results for rail-based systems are more tentative, given the non-availability of 
data and the diversity of systems (trams, underground railways and suburban 
railways).  Nonetheless some useful comparisons can be drawn with the bus systems 
in our data:
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• The average cost-recovery ratio for rail, at 0.37, is only two-thirds that of bus, 
whilst the revenue per passenger km for bus (0.08 ECUs) is around 70% that of rail 
(0.11 ECUs). 
•  The mean loads are nearly twice that for rail (40) as for bus (24). 
•  Average cost per passenger km for rail is, at 0.47 ECUs, roughly twice that of bus. 
•  Staff Costs at 33,564 ECUs per full time employee per annum, are around 14% 
higher than those for bus. 
•  Non-staff costs per vehicle km, at 5.3 ECUs, are  more than four times higher for 
rail systems than for road.  This reflects that rail systems have greater 
responsibilities for their track, traffic management systems and terminals than road 
based public transport systems. 
•  The receipts per vehicle km, at 1.85 ECUs are around 45% more than for bus 
systems. 
•  The total cost per vehicle kms for rail, at 7.48 ECUs  is almost three times that for 
bus. 
•  The staff productivity, in terms of vehicle kms per member of staff at 6,957 is only  
65% of that achieved by bus operators. 
 
3.2 Cost and financial indicators 
HFA produced a report for DGVII on the organisation and operation of urban public 
transport in the then 12 Member States of the Community (HFA, 1994).  This work 
included the construction of fare box ratios (fares divided by operating costs) for a 
sample of 15 cities and is shown by Table 3.2.1.  This work has been updated and 
extended to 52 cities and is shown by Table 3.2.2 (see also Halcrow Fox, 1996B).  It 
should be noted that subsidy definition may not be consistent across cities in Table  
3.2.2.  For example, in  the UK the fuel tax rebate that operators receive from central 
Government has not been included nor have concessionary fare reimbursements 
(which are subsidy to users not operators).  Similarly, the subsidy received from the 
"versement" in France does not seem to be included.  
 
Of the 52 cities in Table 3.2.2, 14 have seen a relative increase in subsidy levels, 13 
have seen subsidy levels remain stable and 25 have seen relative declines in subsidy 
levels.  Where subsidy levels have been increasing, this may be due to unfavourable 
external factors, principally economic recession, rising car ownership and 
decentralisation of urban activities.  Where subsidy levels have been decreasing there 
are two principal causes.  Firstly, declining operating costs due to tendering.  In the 
1990s the Scandinavian countries have introduced tendering with some marked 
reductions in relative subsidy levels (e.g. Gothenburg down 23%).  In other 
Scandinavian cities, subsidy reductions have been achieved by fare increases as part 
of a policy to commercialise urban public transport operations.  A policy of 
commercialisation has also been undertaken by STIB in Brussels which has resulted 
in  
the cost recovery ratio increasing from 28% to 33% between 1982 and 1995.  The 
main causes have been a 13% reduction in staff, a 3% reduction in vehicle kms and a 
3% increase in passenger journeys. 
  
40
 
 
Secondly, increasing revenue due to pro-public transport subsidies.  This is 
particularly associated with the French system of "versement" coupled with private 
sector operators running network contracts. For example, relative subsidy levels have 
declined by 27% in the Lille region and 14% in Nantes, although elsewhere in France 
relative subsidy levels have been either stable or have increased.  Alternative data for 
the Netherlands supplied by NEA suggests that for eight Dutch cities (Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht, Groningen, Nijmegen, Maastricht and Dordrecht) the 
average subsidy requirement has fallen from over 70% of operating costs to 56% 
between 1986 and 1994.  This has been achieved through substantial increases in 
revenue, in response to  pro-public transport policies mentioned, coupled with a 10% 
increase in operating costs. 
 
Anderson (1993) notes, on the basis of Scandinavian evidence, that the process of 
change is almost impossible to bring about unless there is a strain on public budgets.  
It is possible that the conditions required for European Monetary Union within the 
Community will create these pressures.  However, the present situation sees a 
divergence in the cost and financial indicators for urban public transport in European 
cities rather than a convergence. Many European cities are making efforts to promote 
public transport rather than cut costs.  It is understandable why such a policy is 
popular with decision makers but it appears less effective than tendering in financial 
terms.  There may be valid micro-economic reasons for such policy divergence, but it 
is possible that in the near future macro-economic considerations will promote 
convergence towards more overt cost cutting policies. 
 
TABLE 3.2.1:  FAREBOX RATIOS IN DIFFERENT EUROPEAN CITIES 
 
City Country Operating 
Costs (Ecus 
000) 
Fare 
Revenues 
(Ecus 000) 
Farebox 
Ratio 
Antwerp 
Liege 
Brussels 
Aarhus 
Copenhagen 
Marseilles 
Hamburg 
Dublin 
Milan 
Luxembourg 
Den Haag 
Barcelona 
Seville 
Valencia 
London 
Belgium 
Belgium 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Spain 
Spain 
UK 
51,257 
43,714 
222,953 
41,409 
227,517 
109,446 
398,775 
134,338 
494,834 
25,534 
125,972 
243,507 
47,228 
50,065 
1,333,860 
21,110 
18,711 
77,862 
29,733 
122,691 
72,467 
239,683 
144,511 
148,363 
8,932 
37,539 
128,465 
24,880 
32,647 
1,272,198 
0.41 
0.43 
0.35 
0.72 
0.54 
0.66 
0.60 
1.08 
0.30 
0.35 
0.30 
0.53 
0.53 
0.65 
0.95 
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TABLE 3.2.2:  SUBSIDY AND COMMERCIAL INCOME RATES AS PERCENTAGES OF 
TOTAL OPERATING COST 
 
  Subsidy as % of 
operating costs 
Commercial income as 
% of operating costs 
     
City Country 93/94 94/95 95/96 93/94 94/95 95/96      
Vienna 
Antwerp 
Brussels 
Charleroi 
Liege 
Copenhagen 
Bordeaux 
Grenoble 
Lille/Roubaix/Tourcoing 
Lyon 
Marseille 
Nantes 
Paris 
Aachen 
Berlin 
Bonn 
Essen 
Frankfurt 
Hamburg 
Karlsruhe 
Koln 
Magdeburg 
Munchen 
Nurenburg 
Stuttgart 
Athens 
Dublin 
Bologna 
Milan 
Rome 
Bergen 
Oslo 
Lisbon 
Barcelona 
Barcelona 
Madrid 
Valencia 
Goteborg 
Malmo 
Stockholm 
Basle 
Bern 
Geneva 
Zurich 
Amsterdam 
Den Haag 
Rotterdam 
Bristol 
Glasgow 
Leeds/Bradford 
Manchester 
Newcastle 
Austria 
Belgium 
Belgium 
Belgium 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Italy 
Italy 
Norway 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Spain 
Spain 
Spain 
Sweden 
Sweden 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 
Switzerland 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
UK 
47.7 
58.8 
65.1 
68 
61 
46 
62.4 
38 
46 
49 
41.3 
51.2 
53 
26 
61 
62.5 
55 
44 
38 
45.7 
47 
70 
48 
62 
55 
48 
19 
64 
48.2 
86.9 
30.2 
38 
31.9 
56.7 
43 
30 
43 
70 
61.6 
64 
15 
28.6 
47 
32 
77.5 
70.2 
80 
8 
28.3 
27 
23.4 
30 
47.7 
58.8 
62 
68 
61.6 
46 
62.4 
38 
46.5 
52 
36.7 
47.8 
53 
26 
61 
64 
66 
60 
38 
45.7 
47 
70 
48 
65 
55 
48 
4.4 
64 
47.3 
85.2 
23.2 
31 
31.7 
56.7 
43 
35 
43 
60 
60 
64 
15 
28.3 
56 
32 
77.5 
68.2 
79.2 
8 
16.7 
27 
25.6 
2 
59.9 
58.8 
62 
68 
61.8 
46 
63.2 
38 
33.5 
52 
40.6 
44 
44.4 
26 
57 
64 
66 
52.9 
46 
45.7 
55 
52 
48 
69 
55 
48 
4.4 
62 
48 
85.2 
17 
36 
30.9 
47.3 
40.3 
34.5 
43 
54 
60 
58 
15 
12 
54 
 
70.2 
68.4 
79.2 
8 
16.7 
27 
25.6 
2 
0.3 
2.7 
2.6 
3.1 
1.2 
2 
3.4 
 
 
 
1.6 
2 
15 
 
6 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
2 
1.8 
1.7 
6.6 
8 
 
1.1 
2.5 
2 
2.4 
 
6.1 
6 
 
6.6 
 
15 
0 
2.7 
 
 
 
3 
6.4 
2 
0.3 
2.7 
5 
3.1 
2.1 
2 
3.4 
 
 
 
1.6 
2 
15 
 
6 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
2 
1.9 
2.1 
3 
12 
 
1.1 
2.5 
2 
2.4 
 
5 
6 
 
6.1 
 
15 
0 
2.4 
 
 
 
3 
5.1 
2 
0.3 
2.7 
5 
3.1 
2 
2 
3.2 
 
 
 
7 
7 
19.2 
 
10 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
4.5 
2.8 
2.1 
4.2 
6 
 
1.7 
2.4 
1.6 
2.4 
 
5 
8 
 
7 
7 
 
4.9 
1.9 
 
 
 
3 
5.1 
0 
     
Source: Janes Urban Transport Systems 1993/4, 1994/5 and 1995/6 
     
Note: Commercial income relates to off-vehicle income related to leasing of property, advertising & ancillary activities 
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3.3 Quality indicators 
Based on our earlier, theoretical work, four main organisational forms could be 
assessed: 
 
(i) The Classical, regulated model 
(ii) The Scandinavian model of contracting out of operations 
(iii) The French model of contracting out of planning and operators within 
guidelines established by Government 
(iv) The deregulated, competitive model. 
 
TABLE 3.3.1:  EVALUATION OF FORMS OF ORGANISATION 
 
 Classical Scandinavian French Deregulated 
Long-term vision Government Government Government Government 
(limited) 
Network planning Government, 
based on 
proposals from 
transport 
companies 
Government Transport 
company, within 
government 
guidelines 
Market 
Market mechanism 
in network 
planning and set-up 
of timetable 
No No Yes Yes 
Operation Concession 
appointed by 
government 
Concession in 
competition 
Concession in 
competition on 
network basis 
Market 
Market mechanism 
in operation 
No Yes Yes Yes 
 
The characteristics of these four organisational forms are summarised by Table 3.31.  
A series of  ten quality indicators have been detected.  The first eight relate to the 
quality of network design and planning, whilst the last two relate to the quality of 
operation. 
 
1. Supply measures such as vehicle kms, seat/place kms, route kms and vehicle 
kms per route km (density).  In the classical model and the Scandinavia model, 
supply is under pressure.  This is also true for the French model, except in 
certain cities where new modes have been introduced (tramways and VAL 
systems).  With deregulated urban markets, supply is stronger.  For example, 
in Great Britain vehicle kms have increased by 24% (Mackie, Preston and 
Nash, 1995) since deregulation.  However, these increases are concentrated on 
busy routes and times and as a result there gaps in provision which need to be 
filled by tendering. 
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2. Network design and quality indicators.  These may include percentage of 
passengers with direct route, average transfer times, the ratio of public 
transport distance to crow-fly distance, existence of integrated ticketing and 
schedule efficiency.  It is believed that deregulated systems score poorly for 
these indicators, whilst the Scandinavian model also has relatively little 
incentive to improve these measures. 
 
3. Effectiveness indicators such as journeys, trips, passenger kilometres and 
mode-split.  It is believed that in deregulated systems lack of integrated supply 
can lead to decreases in effectiveness.  For example, demand has decreased by 
27% since deregulation in Britain, although the trend is also generally 
negative for the other three forms. 
 
4. Comfort and Convenience indicators such as percentage of low floor buses, 
percentage of passengers seated, quality of stops, cleanliness, quality of 
available information, age of vehicles. 
 
5. Environmental indicators such as the percentage of vehicle kms realised by 
environmental friendly techniques.  It is believed that deregulated systems 
score poorly on categories 4. and 5., whilst in the other three models there may 
be a quantity/quality trade-off but scope exists for Governments to set quality 
standards. 
 
6. Indicators of the quality of supply in terms of speed.  Other measures include 
percentage of route kilometres with exclusive rights of way and percentage of 
traffic lights where public transport has priority. 
 
7. Indicators of safety and personal security.  An indicator of personal security 
may be provided by the percentage of stations that are staffed.  Staffing levels 
come under particular pressure in deregulated regimes.  This is also a problem 
area for the other organisational forms, although there have been some 
important initiatives developed under the French model. 
 
8. Indicators of affordability such as average fare level per km, concessionary 
rates etc.  Low tariffs are mostly found with the classical model (e.g. in Italy) 
but this may also result in low quality due to insufficient funds for investment.  
Within the French model, the transport company often has the opportunity to 
use tariff differentiation as a marketing instrument, whereas in the 
Scandinavian model tariffs are set by Government.  Deregulation may lead to 
large increases in prices (e.g. up 17% in Great Britain). 
 
9. Indicators of service delivery such as reliability (percentage of timetable trips 
cancelled), punctuality (percentage of timetable trips delayed by 5 minutes or 
more) and failures (e.g. escalators, ticketing systems, information).  
Contractual systems may provide incentives so as to improve service delivery. 
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10. Indicators of customer opinion.  Attitudinal surveys may be undertaken to 
develop a quality index based on several items (e.g. Copenhagen).  These 
surveys may be repeated amongst the same group of users to form a panel of 
data.  Creation of a client platform/focus groups may also be useful. 
 
From the ISOTOPE factual database we were able to produce a series of quality 
indicators for the following modes of bus, tram/LRT, underground and suburban rail.  
The following indicators were used: 
 
x Vehicle kilometres per head of population (VK/P)  
x Vehicle kilometres per route kilometre (traffic density VK/RK)  
x Route kilometres per km2 (network density RK/A) 
x Passenger kilometres per head of population (PK/P) 
x Mean Speed in the Peak (MSP) 
x Mean Speed in the Off-Peak (MSO) 
x The proportion of route kilometres that are bus lanes (RK/BL) 
 
As in section 3.1 the database was relatively comprehensive for bus but far less so for 
the other rail based modes.  Despite this Quality Indicators have been produced for all 
four modes and presented as a series of four tables.  Due to reasons of commercial 
confidentiality, the results are aggregated by geographic area and presented as mean 
averages (M), standard deviations (SD) and the number of observations (Ob).  All the 
measures are per annum. 
 
The results for bus are presented in  Table 3.3.2 and are as follows: 
 
•  The average number of vehicle kms per capita is 32.3 kms, this compares with the 
highest figure for the Nordic countries at 62 kms and the lowest for Spain and 
France at around 17-20kms. 
•  The average number of vehicle kms per route km is 37,722 kms.  The highest is for 
the British Isles at almost 65,000 kms, suggesting a frequent service concentrated 
on a small network.  France has the lowest figure at around 20,000 kms, followed 
by the Nordic countries with around 22,500 kms. 
•  Route kms per area km2  averages out at 2.87 kms with the highest figures being 
posted by Portugal (7.87 kms) and Spain (4.76 kms), however, the high standard 
deviation for the last two would suggest that the data maybe somewhat unreliable.  
The lowest figure is posted by the Nordic countries at 0.46 kms.  This reflects the 
low population densities in Nordic cities. 
•  Passenger kms per capita averages out at 355 kms.  The highest figures are for 
Portugal and the British Isles at 729 kms and 659 kms respectively, whilst the 
lowest figures are for Italy and Greece at 58 kms and France at 68 kms.  We 
suspect that the French figures for passenger kms actually refer to passengers.   If 
the mean trip length in France is 5 kms this would increase the French figure to 
340 passenger kms per capita, which is close to the average. We think the same 
problem may exist with the Italy and Greece data.  This problem will have affected  
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 all our results for France, Italy and Greece where passenger kms are part of the 
index.  
•  The average mean peak speed by bus operators averages out at 17.6 kms per hour 
(kph), with the highest speeds being recorded by the Nordic countries (25.1 kph) 
and the lowest by Portugal at (10.9 kph). 
•  The mean off-peak speed is recorded at 20.8 kph around 3 kph faster than the mean 
off-peak speed.  The highest speed is recorded again by the Nordic countries at 
29.4 kph and the lowest by Portugal at 10.9 kph. 
•  The average percentage of route kms that are bus lanes is 2.25%.  The lowest 
figure is recorded by the British Isles at 0.44% and the highest by the Nordic 
countries at 3.67%. 
 
TABLE 3.3.2:  QUALITY INDICATORS - BUS 
 
Country  VK VK RK PK   RK 
 
 P RK A P MSP MSO BL 
Benelux M 24.39 37944 1.13 225 21.6 21.9 0.43% 
 
SD 5.44 20791 0.45 85.8 1.64 1.59 0.4 
 
Ob 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
France M 20.88 19688 1.40 68 16.47 17.37 2.58% 
 
SD 5.94 10698 0.48 25.6 3.86 3.17 1.89 
 
Ob 2 2 6 2 5 5 6 
Germany M 31.77 40760 2.14 376 20.67 22.71 2.06% 
& Austria SD 13.9 15980 1.47 201 1.97 2.25 1.03 
 
Ob 7 7 7 7 6 7 4 
Italy & 
Greece 
M 31.7 43449 4.01 58 14.86 17.72 3.4% 
 
SD 6.65 30618 6.00 30.1 0.97 2.19 3.9 
 
Ob 5 5 4 3 5 5 5 
Portugal M 36.81 na 7.87 729 10.93 14.75 2.93% 
 
SD 16.33 na 9.86 304 2.13 2.75 2.52 
 
Ob 3 na 5 3 3 2 2 
Nordic M 62.03 22510 0.46 567 25.1 29.41 3.67% 
 
SD 24.2 12479 0.49 158 8 9.51 1.91 
 
Ob 6 5 4 6 6 6 4 
Spain M 17.16 34856 4.76 157 11.35 14.4 2.47% 
 
SD 5.23 15234 5.57 122 0.89 1.67 0.8 
 
Ob 4 3 4 4 4 6 2 
British Isles M 33.97 64844 1.18 659 19.5 28.5 0.44% 
 
SD 32.97 0 0.73 17.3 4.75 11.99 0.42 
 
Ob 2 1 3 2 4 4 2 
Average  32.3 37722 2.87 355 17.6 20.81 2.25 
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The results for tram and light rapid transit are presented in Table 3.3.3 and are as 
follows: 
 
•  The average vehicle kms per capita is around 10.7 kms which is three times lower 
than for bus.  The lowest figure is recorded by the British Isles at 1.6 kms and the 
highest by Germany at 37 kms.   
•  The average number of vehicle kms per route kms has an average figure of around 
154,000 kms, around four times that for bus.  The highest recorded figure is for 
France with around 445,000 kms, although the high standard deviation suggests 
that the figure for Germany may be more appropriate at 203,079 kms.    The lowest 
figure posted is that for the Benelux countries at around 75,000 kms. 
•  Route kms per area km2 averages out at 0.342 kms, with the highest figure being 
recorded by Germany at 0.383 kms and the lowest by the British Isles at 0.021kms. 
•  Passenger kms per capita has an average figure of 208 kms, with the highest figure 
being recorded by Germany (743 kms) and the lowest figure by the British Isles at 
16.1 kms. 
•  The mean average off-peak speed is greater than the peak speed by around 3 kms.  
The lowest speeds are recorded by Italy & Greece and the highest by France. 
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TABLE 3.3.3:  QUALITY INDICATORS - TRAM 
 
Country  VK VK RK PK   
  P RK A P MSP MSO 
Benelux M 6.87 74810 0.327 199 18.84 20.44 
 
SD 4.61 22153 0.265 159 4.06 3.51 
 
Ob 3 3 5 5 5 5 
France M 4.68 445688 0.028 na 26.65 26.65 
 
SD 2.05 393569 0.017 na 8.35 8.35 
 
Ob 4 4 4 na 2 2 
Germany M 37.16 203079 0.383 743 19.86 21.3 
& Austria SD 19.63 28564 0.182 402 3.8 3.1 
 
Ob 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Italy &  
Greece 
M 13.71 94581 1.12 40 11.4 15.3 
 
SD 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Ob 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Portugal M 1.81 118286 0.183 87.7 10 na 
 
SD 0 0 0.150 0 0 na 
 
Ob 1 1 2 1 1 na 
Nordic M 9.05 48864 0.332 162 19 20 
 
SD 0 0 0.240 0 3 2 
 
Ob 1 1 2 1 2 2 
Spain M na na na na na na 
 
SD na na na na na na 
 
Ob na na na na na na 
British Isles M 1.6 95412 0.021 16.1 26 26 
 
SD 0.34 12652 0.003 0 4 4 
 
Ob 2 2 2 1 2 2 
Average  10.7 154389 0.342 208 18.8 21.6 
 
The results for the underground are presented in Table 3.3.4 and are as follows:- 
 
•  Vehicle kms per capita for the underground has an average figure of around 18.07 
kms, nearly, twice that for tram and around 55% of  bus.  The highest figure is 
recorded by the Nordic countries and Germany at 32 kms and 31 kms respectively, 
whilst the lowest is recorded by France at 7.55 kms. 
•  The average number of vehicle kms per route kms is around 467,000 kms, 
significantly higher than for both bus and tram.  The highest figure being recorded 
by Portugal at 752,000 kms, whilst the lowest is that for the Nordic countries at 
152,000 kms. 
•  Route kms per area km2 has an average figure of 0.087 kms, with the highest figure 
being recorded by the Benelux countries at 0.173 kms and the lowest from the 
Nordic countries at 0.021kms. 
•  Passenger kms per capita is 510 kms, the highest figure being recorded by Portugal 
at 868 kms, and the lowest 125 kms by Italy/Greece. 
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•  The average peak and off-peak speeds are basically the same at around 29 kms per 
hour, considerably higher than for both bus and tram. 
 
TABLE 3.3.4 :  QUALITY INDICATORS - UNDERGROUND 
 
Country  VK VK RK PK   
 
 P RK A P MSP MSO 
Benelux M 11.23 266998 0.173 301 35 35.1 
 
SD 3.05 96113 0.027 160 4.6 4.4 
 
Ob 3 3 3 3 3 3 
France M 7.55 325040 0.06 na 18.3 18.3 
 
SD 3.59 156560 0.019 na 0 0 
 
Ob 2 2 2 na 1 1 
Germany M 31 714549 0.137 689 32.3 32.3 
 
SD 5.79 109258 0.077 218 2.49 2.49 
 
Ob 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Italy & Greece M 17.82 745753 0.156 125 29 30.3 
 
SD 13.5 168830 0.108 32 0 0 
 
Ob 2 2 2 2 1 1 
Portugal M 8.94 752479 0.025 868 33 na 
 
SD 0 0 0 0 0 na 
 
Ob 1 1 1 1 1 na 
Nordic M 32 152000 0.021 619 33 33 
 
SD 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 
 
Ob 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Spain M 17.93 309575 0.035 456 28.4 28.4 
 
SD 0.551 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Ob 2 1 1 1 1 1 
British Isles M na na na na na na 
 
SD na na na na na na 
 
Ob na na na na na na 
Average  18.07 466628 0.087 510 29.9 29.6 
 
The results for suburban rail are presented in Table 3.3.5.  This is the mode with the 
least coverage available, the results are as follows:- 
 
•  The average number of vehicle kms per capita is 10.5 kms, a figure similar to that 
for trams.  The highest figure recorded is that for Germany at 18.8 kms, with the 
lowest being recorded by the British Isles at 2.82 kms.   
•  The average number of  vehicle kms per route km is around 148,000 kms.  The 
figures range from 23,382 kms (British Isles) up to 341,500 kms for Germany. 
•  Route kms per area km2 averages 0.12 kms, below that for bus and tram but higher 
than for the underground.  The highest figure recorded is that for Portugal at 0.2 
kms and the lowest is that for the Nordic countries at 0.056 kms. 
•  Passenger kms per capita, averages 372 kms per annum, a similar figure to that for 
bus.  The lowest figure is for the British Isles at 56 kms and the highest for 
Germany at 845 kms. 
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•  The mean peak and off-peak speeds are quite similar at 45.2  and 48.3 kph 
respectively.  These speeds are the highest of all the modes examined. 
 
TABLE 3.3.5:  QUALITY INDICATORS - SUBURBAN RAIL 
 
Country  VK VK RK PK   
  P RK A P MSP MSO 
Benelux M na na na na na na 
 SD na na na na na na 
 Ob na na na na na na 
France M na na na na na na 
 SD na na na na na na 
 Ob na na na na na na 
Germany M 18.8 341500 0.067 845 na na 
& Austria SD 7.76 0 0 188 na na 
 Ob 2 1 1 2 na na 
Italy & Greece M na na na na na na 
 SD na na na na na na 
 Ob na na na na na na 
Portugal M 4.41 80373 0.201 172 35.8 na 
 SD 0 0 0.085 0 0 na 
 Ob 1 1 2 1 1 na 
Nordic M na na 0.056 340 55 55 
 SD na na 0.015 0 0 0 
 Ob na na 2 1 1 1 
Spain M 14.15 na na 445 45 45 
 SD 0 na na 0 0 0 
 Ob 1 na na 1 1 1 
British Isles M 2.82 23382 0.157 56.1 45 45 
 SD 0.405 2218 0.038 18.2 5 5 
 Ob 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Average  10.05 148418 0.12 372 45.2 48.3 
 
The ISOTOPE opinion survey of authorities and operators has also provided some 
useful data (see Tables 3.3.6 to 3.3.9).  The main findings were: 
 
x In terms of efficiency and effectiveness (Table 3.3.6),  the results for the classical 
model were mixed, the models with limited competition (France and Scandinavia) 
were believed to be both efficient and effective, whilst the deregulated system was 
not believed to be effective. 
 
x Table 3.3.7 indicates that authorities regard the deregulated systems as difficult to 
manage, the French system encourages both innovation and cohesion between 
authorities and operators, the Scandinavian system has led to improvements, whilst 
the classical system has limited innovation and in some countries (e.g. Portugal)  
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 has led to a lack of clarity concerning the responsibilities of operators and 
authorities. 
 
x Table 3.3.8 indicates that although most groups are believed to be satisfied with 
the classical and limited competition models, only operators in the United 
Kingdom are considered to believe that deregulation has had a positive effect. 
 
x Table 3.3.9 shows that in both the classical and deregulated models quality 
management and control is believed to be the responsibility of the operator.  In the 
French and Scandinavian models there is a greater tendency for the roles to be 
fulfilled by the authorities through minimum service standards, community impacts 
etc.  Fare policy is generally considered to be the task of the authorities. 
 
TABLE 3.3.6:  OPINION OF THE AUTHORITIES ON EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
 
 Authorities Operators 
  Classical 
 model 
Limited 
competition 
Deregulated Classical 
model 
Limited 
competition 
  
(NL, B, 
SP, P) 
(F, N, SW) (UK) (NL, B, 
SP, P, D, I) 
(F, N) 
 Yes 2 4 - 18 4 
Efficient Neutral 10 3 4 14 1 
 No 1 2 1 5 - 
 Yes 4 8 - 21 4 
Effective Neutral 9 - 2 16 1 
 No - - 3 1 - 
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TABLE 3.3.7:  THE OPINION OF THE AUTHORITIES AND OPERATORS ON THE 
CURRENT SYSTEM 
(answers given by authorities) 
 
 Authorities Operators 
  Classical  
model 
Limited 
competition 
Deregulated Classical  
model  
Limited  
competition 
  (NL, B,  
SP, P) 
(F, N, SW) (UK) (NL, B, 
SP, P,D,I) 
(F, N) 
 
Yes 5 3 - 13 2 
Encourage 
innovation 
Neutral 5 6 4 14 4 
 
No 6 1 1 20 1 
 
Yes 5 6 - 15 5 
Manageable Neutral 7 5 1 19 2 
 
No 3 - 4 10 - 
 
Yes 5 6 1 15 3 
Leads to            
improvements 
Neutral 9 3 1 18 4 
 
No 1 1 3 13 - 
 
Yes 5 6 2 25 4 
Impact on  
efficiency 
Neutral 8 4 2 12 2 
 
No 1 - 1 9 - 
 
Yes 4 6 2 18 3 
Impacts on  
level of 
Neutral 3 4 1 17 4 
patronage No 5 - 2 10 - 
Impacts on 
the cohesion 
between 
Yes 10 5 2 21 6 
authority 
and operator 
Neutral 3 4 1 19 1 
 
No 2  1 2 9 - 
 
Yes 4 4 2 20 3 
Impacts of 
effectivess 
Neutral 8 6 2 17 4 
 
No 3 - 1 6 - 
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TABLE 3.3.8:  THE OPINION OF VARIOUS GROUPS ON THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
(ANSWERS GIVEN BY AUTHORITIES) 
 
 Authorities Operators 
  Classical  
model 
Limited 
competition 
Deregulated Classical 
model 
Limited 
 competition 
  (NL, B,  
SP, P) 
(F, N, SW) (UK) (NL, B, SP 
P, D, I) 
(F, N) 
 
Positive 3 5 - 21 5 
Authorities Neutral 3 5 3 17 1 
 
Negative 1 - 2 3 - 
 
      
 
Positive 5 8 4 29 5 
Operators Neutral 2 2 1 17 1 
 
Negative - - - 1 - 
 
      
 
Positive 5 3  17 3 
Users Neutral 3 7 4 25 3 
 
Negative 1 - 1 3 - 
 
      
 
Positive 4 5 1 17 1 
Employers Neutral 3 5 3 24 4 
 
Negative 1 - - 2 1 
 
      
 
Positive 5 3 1 18 2 
Trade 
unions 
Neutral - 6 1 16 3 
 Negative 1 - 3 6 1 
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TABLE 3.3.9:  WHO SHOULD BE THE DECISION MAKERS IN QUALITY ASPECTS 
(ANSWERS GIVEN BY THE AUTHORITIES) 
 
 Authorities Operators 
 
 
Classical 
model 
Limited 
competition 
Deregulated Classical  
model 
Limited 
competition 
  (NL, B, 
SP, P) 
(F, N, SW) (UK) (NL, B, SP) 
(P, D, I) 
(F, N) 
 
Authorities 13 10 4 25 4 
Overall transport 
policy 
Neutral 3 - 1 21 3 
 
Operators - - - - - 
 
      
 
Authorities 10 8 5 12 4 
Minimum 
 service 
Neutral 6 2 - 16 1 
standards Operators - - - 8 2 
 
      
 
Authorities 8 10 4 18 4 
Community  
impact 
Neutral 2 - 1 23 2 
 
Operators - - - 1 - 
 
      
 
Authorities 7 5 - 3 2 
Quality 
management  
Neutral 4 5 3 21 3 
and control Operators 4 - 2 22 1 
 
      
 
Authorities - 4 1 2 - 
Information  
to the public 
Neutral 6 3 3 15 - 
 
Operators 5 2 1 30 7 
 
      
 
Authorities 7 9 3 12 3 
Fare policy Neutral 2 1 2 20 3 
 
Operators 2 - - 15 1 
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3.4 Operating cost analysis 
 
The aim of this work was to examine the relationship between costs and outputs, input 
prices and measures of organisational and regulatory factors.  This work was based on 
combining the 188 observations from the ISOTOPE database with 56 observations 
from the database compiled by Wunsch (1996A,B).  This gave a combined data set of 
244 cross sectional observations.  The variables considered were: operating cost, 
vehicle kilometres, line kilometres, wage rate and vehicle price.  In the event only 49 
observations contained all five variables, with this figure increasing to 75 
observations if only four variables (excluding line kilometres) were considered.  This 
is because our data set is affected by both missing and extreme values.  Our analysis 
was limited to bus services as an insufficient number of observations were available 
to undertake analysis for rail modes.  A correlation matrix for the independent 
variables was examined.  This indicated that there were no problems of 
multicollinearity.  More details of this work are provided by Perez-Perez, 1996. 
 
A translog model of the following form was estimated: 
 
ln ln ln ln ln
(ln ) (ln ) (ln ) (ln )
ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln
C VK LK P P
VK LK P P
P P VK LK VK P VK P
LK P LK P DV
o v l l l k k
vv l kk k
lk l k vl v l vk k
lk k
     
  
    
 
D D D E E
G G J J
J I U U
U U \
12 12 12 12
2
11
2
11
2 2
1
11 1
 
 
where 
 
C = Operating cost per annum 
VK = Vehicle kilometres per annum 
LK = Line kilometres per annum 
Pl = Price of labour 
Pk = Price of vehicles 
DV = Dummy Variable (= 1 if city in Great Britain, 0 otherwise) 
 
The following models were tested: 
 
(I) No restrictions 
(II) Homogeneity of degree one in input prices 
 E E J J J U U U Ul k kk lk vl vk lk         1 0 0 0 011 11; ; ; ;  
(III) Homotheticity (separability of inputs from outputs) 
 U U U Uvl vk lk    11 0  
(IV) Linear separability test 
 J lk  0  
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(V) Homogeneity and unitary elasticity of substitution (Cobb-Douglas) 
 
 G G J J J I U U U Uvv ll ll kk lk vl vl vk u lk          0 0 0 0; ; ;  
 
Statistical tests, based on the log-likelihood ratios, supported models II and IV.  As 
model IV is a special case of model II, model II was used for further analysis.  This 
model is given by Table 3.4.1.  One important finding was that we were unable to 
support a hypothesis of Cobb-Douglas production technology - a finding which is 
consistent with other studies (see, for example, Berechman, 1993, Table 5.2). 
 
It should be noted that of the 15 parameter values estimated, only five are significant 
at the 5% level although this reflects the small number of degrees of freedom 
available.  However, the model exhibits excellent goodness of fit, with 98% of 
variation being explained. 
 
TABLE 3.4.1: PREFERRED TRANSLOG MODEL 
OF OPERATING COSTS 
 
 Parameter 
Value 
Standard 
Error 
Do -13.276 19.67* 
Dv 2.91 2.63* 
Dl -3.92 1.42 
El -1.45 2.07* 
Ek 2.45 2.07* 
Gvv -0.178 0.180* 
Gll -0.013 0.011* 
Jll -0.030 0.119* 
Jkk 0.030 0.119* 
Jlk - - 
Ivl 0.232 0.087 
Uvl 0.236 0.135* 
Uvk -0.236 0.135* 
Ull -0.336 0.088 
Ulk 0.336 0.088 
\ -0.829 0.269 
 
R2  0.984 
R2  0.980 
Log Likelihood 11.27 
*  Not significant at the 5% level 
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From this model, we can estimate the returns to density as: 
 
RTD C
VK
 ª¬«
º
¼»  
w
w
ln
ln
.
1
0 86 1 
 
This suggests that there are diseconomies of density i.e. decreasing returns to density.  
This may occur because the densest networks are the most congested.  This could be 
due to external factors, in particular speed.  This variable was tested but was 
insignificant and reduced the plausibility of the overall model. 
 
We can also estimate the returns to scale as: 
 
RTS C
VK
C
LK
 ª¬«
º
¼»  
w
w
w
w
ln
ln
ln
ln
.
1
0 71 1 
 
This suggests that there are diseconomies of scale i.e. decreasing returns to scale.  
This may arise because as firms get larger they become more difficult to manage 
efficiently and become prone to x-inefficiency. 
 
Our results therefore suggest that, on average, European bus operators produce too 
many vehicle kilometres and too many line kilometres, but any reduction in vehicle 
kilometres should be greater than the reduction of line kilometres.  However, our 
results suggest that size is not too important, given the wide confidence intervals 
around our parameter values both our RTD and RTS estimates are insignificantly 
different from one.  We are unable to reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale 
with this model.  It should be noted that with a slightly different version of the above 
model, we omitted line kilometres as a variable and calculated a returns to scale with 
respect to vehicle kms of 0.33 and with respect to passengers of 0.74.  This model 
again exhibits decreasing returns to scale, particularly where vehicle kms is the 
output. 
 
We were able to calculate the Allen’s partial elasticity of substitution from this model 
using the following general formulae: 
 
V J V Jij ij i j
i j
ii
ij i i
i
S S
S S
and
S S
S
    
2
2  
 
Assuming Sl (labour’s share of costs) = 0.7, and Sk (capital’s share of costs) = 0.3 
then the following results are obtained: 
 
V V
V
V
lk kl
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 
 
1
0
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.
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The own and cross price elasticities of factor demand can then be estimated using the 
general formula: 
 
E Sij ij i V  
 
This gives the following results: 
 
E E E Elk kl u kk     0 7 0 3 0 343 0180. , . , . , .  
 
In contrast to some, but by no means all, of the studies summarised by Berechman 
(op. cit., Table 5.3), we find relatively strong substitutability between capital and 
labour.  This may reflect different manning arrangements and the use of different 
sized vehicles.  We also find the demand for labour to be relatively inelastic, but 
greater (in absolute terms) than the findings summarised by Berechman (op. cit., 
Table 5.4) who found an average elasticity of -0.10.  Similarly, we find capital to be 
relatively inelastic, but in this case our results are similar to the mean of the 
elasticities studied by Berechman (-0.2). 
 
One other important finding is the dummy variable parameter estimates.  These were 
tested for individual countries and groups of countries.  The only dummy variable 
which had a significant coefficient was that for Great Britain which suggests that, all 
other things being equal, operating costs for bus systems in Great Britain are 56% 
below those of the rest of Europe.  This seems a large difference until it is noted that 
operating costs per bus km have decreased by 42% in Great Britain since 
deregulation. 
 
Given the conclusions about data quality made above, it would obviously be 
dangerous to draw definitive conclusions but there does seem to be a suggestion that 
cost efficiency reduces with operator size.  Our calculations indicate that the mean 
fleet size in our sample is around 300 vehicles.  There is evidence to show that there 
are only limited economies of scale in the production of passenger transport services 
by bus.  While economies of scale exist at relatively small production scales (up to 50 
buses), these seem most often to be exhausted at around 100 buses (see Figure 3.1).  
This is at the  bottom end of the optimal range postulated by Berechman (op. cit.) of 
between 100 and 500 vehicles.  The extent to which such economies of scale can be 
realised depend on particular local market situations (network size and shape).   
 
Besides this type of economies of scale which are related to production with given 
inputs, there are other economies related to decreasing input  prices with increasing 
production size (vehicle price, fuel price, etc.).  There does not seem to be 
diseconomies of scale here. 
 
  
58
The difference between the first type of economies of scale (production) and the 
second type (input price) is that the first one requires a bundled production, i.e. 
production at one place, while the second type of economies of scale can be achieved  
 
 
even if production is not at one place, i.e. scattered all over a country or even 
internationally. 
 
Figure 3.1  Bus Average and Marginal Cost 
 
 
 
 
Marginal 
Cost, 
Average 
Cost 
(ECUs 
per km) 
 
 
 
 
 
    100      300 
         Fleet Size (Vehicles) 
Source: Perez-Perez, 1996, p49. 
 
The above suggests that  reforms that fragment the bus industry, such as competitive 
tendering at a route level, would not necessarily reduce cost efficiency and might 
promote it.  Similarly, restructuring of publicly owned bus companies might be best 
undertaken in units of 100 vehicles or so (i.e. at the depot level). 
 
The consequences of this production structure is that passenger transport companies 
tend to evolve towards the formation of large groups of relatively small companies 
organised  as profit centres.  This structure can be observed in all countries where 
competition has been introduced (Sweden, Denmark, France and Great Britain).  Such 
re-agglomerations may also be for a number of reasons that our model has not taken 
into account: 
 
x Larger companies may be able to lower input prices through the bulk purchase of 
fuel and vehicles and have access to cheaper finance 
x Larger companies can spread fixed costs (e.g. marketing, administration, training) 
over a greater range of outputs 
x Larger companies may, through the long purse hypothesis, be better able to 
withstand competition and be more able to engage in predation. 
 
Marginal 
Cost 
Average 
Cost 
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None of these features is a technological return to scale but they do reflect economies 
of scale. 
 
 
It is useful to reflect on the consistency of our results with those of other studies.  
Berechman (op. cit.) provides an extremely useful review of transit cost elasticities 
and he reports on nine applications of translog models including five European 
examples (DeBorger, Belgium, 1984; Pettreto and Viviani, Italy, 1984; Button and 
O’Donnell, Great Britain, 1985; Gathon, Europe, 1989; de Rus, Spain, 1989).  For the 
bus industry he finds short run economies of capital stock utilisation, related to excess 
vehicle capacity, and some evidence of economies of scope.  We have been unable to 
investigate these effects.  Berechman also finds evidence of large scale economies of 
traffic density and constant scale economies, whereas we find mild diseconomies of 
both density and scale.  For bus systems, the cost implications of network size are 
probably limited, although the demand implications are probably more important but 
we were unable to measure them.  A number of other studies have been undertaken 
including those of Wunsch, Europe, 1996a; Jorgensen, Pederson, Solvoll, Norway, 
1995; Kerstens, France, 1995; Fazioli, Filippinni and Prioni, Italy, 1993; Filipinni, 
Maggi and Prioni, Switzerland, 1992 and Talvitie and Backstrom, Finland, 1989. 
 
It would have been possible to derive total factor productivity indices in the manner 
suggested by Talvitie and Sikow, 1992 or Preston, 1997.  However, there were 
concerns that the results would be unduly affected by data quality and it was therefore 
decided not to undertake analysis of this type. 
 
We have not been able to calibrate cost models with the ISOTOPE and Wunsch rail 
data sets but we were able to undertake some simple analysis with data collected by 
Kilburn (1994) for 14 cities in  four EU countries. This suggested there were 
substantial economies of density with the elasticity of costs with respect to train km 
(holding network km constant) ranging from 0.21 to 0.94.  Savage (1995)  similarly 
found increasing returns to density for mass rail transit systems  in the US, which 
confirmed the earlier work of Pozdena and Merewitz (1978) but failed to find 
diseconomies of density for the largest systems as Viton (1980) had.  Savage also 
found constant returns to scale and suggested that the larger systems could be 
fragmented without  leading to unit cost increases. 
3.5 Demand analysis 
 
The aim of this work is to examine the relationship between demand and fare levels, 
service levels and city size and to see if it is affected by organisational and regulatory 
factors.  The combined Wunsch and ISOTOPE database was again used but due to 
missing values and outliers, the usable sample size was only 89 observations of which 
34 were from Wunsch and 55 were from ISOTOPE.  Again the analysis is limited to 
bus operations and is reported in more detail by Perez-Perez, 1996. 
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Three model forms were investigated: the linear, the log-linear and the semi-
log/negative exponential.  It was found that the log-linear model gave the best fit and 
has the following form: 
 
 
ln ln ln lnQ F VKM POP   D E J G  
 
where 
 
Q = Passengers per annum 
F = Mean fare per trip (in ECUs) 
VKM = Vehicle kms per annum 
POP = Population 
 
The model has the advantage the elasticities are given directly by the parameter 
values i.e. the fare elasticity is given by E and the service elasticity by J.  A series of 
statistical tests were undertaken to ensure zero mean of the disturbance, no 
multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, non autocorrelation, no simultaneity and 
normality.  These hypotheses were accepted with the exception that a White test 
indicated that the model was affected by heteroscedasticity and hence it was re-
estimated using weighted least squares, using as weights the residuals of the original 
ordinary least squares estimation.  It was also found to be appropriate to segment the 
sample into small cities (population below 500,000) and large cities (population 
above 500,000).  The results in terms of elasticities are given by Table 3.5.1. 
 
Table 3.5.1 suggests an unweighted fare elasticity of -0.42 and a service elasticity of 
0.41.  This indicates that demand is inelastic and accords well with the work of others 
(TRRL, 1980, Goodwin, 1992, Berechman, op cit., Table 2.9).  Analysis has been 
taken to see if these values vary by country but they were found to be relatively 
stable. 
 
TABLE 3.5.1:  PRICE AND SERVICE ELASTICITIES 
 (Standard errors in brackets) 
 
Elasticity Small 
City 
Large 
City 
Price 
 
Service 
 
-0.50 
(0.080 
0.33 
(0.065) 
-0.34 
(0.064) 
0.49 
(0.037) 
 
Our explanation for the difference in the elasticities between small and large cities is 
as follows.  The lower fare elasticity in large cities reflects the greater degree of 
captivity to public transport due to longer journey distances (making walking less 
attractive) and greater congestion and parking problems (making car less attractive).  
This assumes that bus fare charges move in line with other public transport modes.  In 
other words, the fare elasticities in Table 4.11 are conditional on all public transport 
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modes having the same proportionate fare charge - which is probably realistic for 
most of the cities studied. 
 
By contrast, demand is more service elastic in big cities than small cities, because of 
the competition from other public transport modes.  In this instance, the elasticities in  
 
Table 4.11 may be thought of as ordinary elasticities rather than conditional 
elasticities.  Another factor may be that service (and hence time) is valued more 
highly in large cities, due to higher income levels.  The implied values of service are 
0.54 ECUs per bus km in small cities and 1.44  ECUs in large cities. 
 
TABLE 3.5.2:  DEMAND MODEL - RESIDUAL ANALYSIS 
 
Country No of obs No of Positive 
Residuals 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Great Britain 
Italy 
Portugal 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Spain 
Switzerland 
Others* 
Total 
4 
20 
6 
7 
5 
11 
7 
7 
9 
6 
7 
89 
1 
4 
5 
3 
4 
7 
3 
3 
5 
6 
5 
46 
 
* Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland and Sweden 
 
Analysis of residuals, given by Table 3.5.2 indicate that there may be some systematic 
variation between countries.  The incidence of positive residuals (where actual 
demand is greater than forecast demand) are recorded.  This indicates, all other things 
being equal, those cities where demand in higher than average.  It can be seen that all 
countries have some good performing cities, with Switzerland and Germany 
performing particularly well.  By contrast, France performs less well.  The higher than 
average levels of demand in Switzerland and Germany may be related to the 
production pattern based on co-ordinated, clock-faced timetables.  This production 
pattern is also the norm in the Netherlands but in that country competition from the 
bicycle is intense.  Table 3.5.2 does suggest that planned networks may have some 
advantages in terms of demand.  However, it should be noted that our  model does not 
take into account the price, level of service and availability of competing modes, 
particularly the car.  A proxy variable, market share, was tested but was found to be 
statistically insignificant.  The variation in Table 3.5.2  may be partly due to variation 
in the competitiveness of the car due to fiscal policies, traffic management policies 
etc. 
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3.6 Franchising analysis 
 
A number of countries in Europe have experimented with contracting-out, tendering, 
franchising of bus services.  In work so far, we have analysed some of the data on this 
issue in the ISOTOPE factual database and reviewed the progress and key empirical 
findings in two areas: Nordic countries and Great Britain. 
 
3.6.1 Results from the ISOTOPE database 
Certain sections of the ISOTOPE factual questionnaire namely, sections 2.3.6 and 2.4, 
asked the respondents questions concerning tendering.  These were divided into two 
sections, directed at operators and authorities respectively.  From the answers a series 
of measures have been developed for both parties and are presented in Table 3.6.1 and 
Table 3.6.2.  Unfortunately, sufficient information was only available in both  sections 
for bus. 
 
In Table 3.6.1 five measures are presented with regard to the operator:  
 
1) the percentage of lines being operated under tender/sub-contract. 
 
2) the percentage of vehicle kms operated under tender/sub-contract. 
 
3) the average number of sub-contracts/tenders held by the operator. 
 
4) the average duration of sub-contracts/tenders held by the operator. 
 
5) the average duration of sub-contracts/tenders held by the operator. 
 
TABLE 3.6.1:  SUB-CONTRACT/TENDERING INDICES - BUS (OPERATOR) 
 
COUNTRY  OPERATOR   
 
% of lines under 
sub-contract 
/tender 
% of vehicle kms 
under sub-
contract/ tender 
average number  
of sub-
contracts/ 
tenders 
average 
duration  
of sub-
contracts/ 
tenders 
Benelux 34.6% 30.7% 35 6 yrs 
France 20% 6% 5 6 yrs 
Germany & 
Austria 
39% 32% 8.3 4.8 yrs 
Italy & Greece 27.3% na 16 4 yrs 
Portugal 14% na 9 1 yr 
Nordic 63% 56.4% 2 3 yrs 
Spain 30% 9% 2.5 20 yrs 
British Isles na 5.6% 53 3 yrs 
Average 32.6% 23.3% 16.35 6 yrs 
Source: ISOTOPE database. 
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The following points can be drawn from Table 3.6.1:- 
 
•  Around 33% of the average European bus operators bus lines are operated under 
sub-contract/tender.  The figure is highest for the Nordic countries at around 63% 
and lowest for Portugal at around 14%. 
•  The average number of vehicle kms operated under tender is around 23%, again 
the Nordic countries operate most vehicle kms (56.4%), with the least being 
operated by the British Isles.  The figures for France and Spain appear to be low 
considering  
 
 the percentage of lines under tender, but may indicate an emphasis on network 
contracts.. 
•  The average number of sub-contracts/tenders operated by each operators is around 
16, however, the average number per country ranges from 53 for the British Isles 
to 2 for the Nordic countries.  From the percentage of vehicle kms operated this 
would suggest that sub-contracts in the British Isles are on a route by route basis, 
whilst in the Nordic countries they are more on a network basis.   
•  The average duration of sub-contracts/tenders operated by each operator is around 
6 yrs.  Contracts are on average highest in Spain  at around 20 years and lowest in 
Portugal at around 1 year. 
 
In Table 3.6.2 a further four measures are presented with regard to Authorities: 
 
1) the percentage of contracts awarded by the authority by  type, either full or net 
subsidy. 
 
2) the average number of bids received per contract tendered, from private and public 
bus operators. 
 
3) the number of contracts awarded by authority to either private or public firms. 
 
4) Average length of contract awarded in years. 
 
TABLE 3.6.2:  TENDERING INDICES - BUS (AUTHORITIES) 
 
COUNTRY  AUTHORITIES   
 
% of contracts 
awarded by 
type 
Average No. 
of bids per 
contract 
No. of contracts 
awarded 
Average 
contract 
length 
 
Full Net Private Public Private Public Yrs 
France 65% 35% 3 2 2.4 1.5 9 
Nordic 90% 10% 3 1.5 6 3.7 5.2  
Spain 100% - 1.5 0 1 0 14.15  
British Isles 20% 80% 2.4 0 421 0 3 
Average 69% 42% 2.8 2.0 108 2.6 7.67 
Source: ISOTOPE Database. 
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•  On average around 69% of the contracts awarded by authorities to bus operators 
are full cost contracts, the rest being net subsidy.  Spain and the Nordic countries 
award nearly all their contracts as full costs, 100% and 90% respectively, whilst 
the British Isles authorities award on average around 80% of their contracts as net 
subsidy. 
•  On average each contract attracts around 3 bids from privately owned bus 
operators and up to 2 bids from publicly owned bus operators.  However, neither 
Spain nor the British Isles attract any bids from the public sector, a reflection of the 
largely privately owned fleets operating in both countries. 
 
•  On average, without Spain and the British Isles inclusion, the number of contracts 
awarded by each authority to operators is around 4.2 to private operators and 2.6 to 
public operators.  From a country perspective it can be seen that the average 
British authority awards a very high number of contracts each year, and all to 
private operators. 
•  The average contract length  is around 8 years, with the longest  contract length 
being around 14 years in Spain and the shortest around 3 years in the British Isles. 
3.6.2 Nordic Countries 
 
3.6.2.1 Sweden 
Jansson (1994B) has reviewed the early stages of comprehensive tendering in 
Sweden, where tendering has been gradually introduced since July 1989.  The 
progress of tendering was monitored in 25 countries.  Initially, around 32% of 
operations were tendered (February 1990), with this expected to reach 68% in the 
near future.  Cost savings from the initial rounds of tendering varied from 0 to 45%, 
with an average of around 12%.  The composition of the market changed in that 
municipals’ shares declined from 37 to 35% and the state owned companies’ (Swebus 
and Postbus) shares declined from 35 to 31%.  The gainers were the independent 
private firms whose shares increased from 27 to 34%, although their numbers 
decreased slightly (from 653 to 627).  One of the features of tendering in Sweden is 
the diversity of contract forms concerning payment method, tendering method, 
responsibility for supervision of operations, vehicles and depots, quality requirements, 
award criteria, contract length, monitoring and sanctions.  Research is ongoing to 
determine whether contract specification has systematic effects on contract price and 
quality. 
 
Later work in Sweden has been undertaken by Pyddoke (1996) who notes that the 
share of tendered bus kilometres has increased from  8% in 1988 to 70% in 1995. 
During this period costs have decreased by 10% where bus contracts were 
competitively tendered.  Empirical analysis has been undertaken 106 contracts let in 
1994. Most contract lengths varied from between 1.5 to 3 years, whilst the majority of 
the contracts were cost indexed (87%), had penalties for cancellations ((70%) and had 
age (82%), size (70%) and environmental (74%) requirements.  All of the contracts 
were of a gross cost form or of a cost plus form or both.  The findings from the 
preferrred model were as follows: 
  
65
 
x Competition reduces costs.  A competition index of the following form was used: 
 CI = 6i 1/i  
 where i = the number of bids. 
 The estimated coefficient implies that moving from one to two bids reduces costs 
by 12%, moving from one to three bids reduces costs by 17% and moving from 
one bid to four bids reduces costs by 20%. 
 
 
 
x The elasticity of costs  per bus km with respect to buses per bus km is -0.12 and 
with respect to routes per bus km is -0.13.  The implies an elasticity of costs with 
 respect to vehicle kms of 1.25 i.e. there are some diseconomies of scale.  
This result is consistent with that in section 3.4. This is  probably an indicator of 
diseconomies of density.  The largest contracts will be in the congested urban areas 
with correspondingly lower speeds.  The fact that costs decrease when the number 
of buses and, particularly, the number of routes increase may be suggesting the 
existence of economies of  scope. 
x Cost per km are 16% lower in sparsely populated areas where speeds will be high 
and peakiness of demand low. 
x Cost plus type contracts appear to be 18% more expensive per km than fixed costs 
contracts (although this result is not statistically significant). 
x Including penalties for late running increases costs by 32% (although this result is 
not statistically significant). 
 
Jansson (op. cit.) also reviews tendering in Copenhagen where costs reduced by 
around 10% between 1989 and 1992.  A feature of the initial Copenhagen model was 
that the municipal operator was not allowed to bid.  Around 20 bids per contract were 
attracted compared to the 3 to 5 bids per contract in Sweden.  Another important 
feature of the Copenhagen model is the quality measuring system that has been 
developed in order to provide operators’ financial incentives.  This is based on 16 
points, 11 related to passenger perception and 5 on objective measurements.  Every 3 
months, the best operator receives a bonus of 1% of the contract sum. 
 
3.6.2.2  Finland 
In Finland, tendering is limited to the Helsinki Metropolitan Area Council (YTV) 
which is responsible for public transport between Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and 
Kaunianinen.  Tendering has cut subsidy costs by 29%, allowed ticket prices to be 
reduced by 8% and mileage to increase by 3% (YTV, 1996). 
 
Although 23 independent firms participated in the tender rounds, the actual number of 
firms operating services decreased from 10 to 6, leading to concerns that in the long 
term concentration will reduce competition and increase costs.  This is a concern in a 
number of Nordic countries. 
 
3.6.2.3  Norway 
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In Norway the background for introducing competitive tendering to public 
transportation was different from Denmark and Sweden. Except in the Oslo-region, 
the private right companies were holding concessions and having the full 
responsibility for planning, operation, marketing, information, sales, fare box revenue, 
etc. The county authorities are according to the law, responsible for concessions and 
approval of fare systems and level, time schedules and subsidies. The relationship 
between authorities and operators was on a net cost basis. Until 1981 the subsidy was  
 
paid by the state to the operating company. From 1981 to -86 the counties got a lump 
sum grant for public transport from the state. From 1986 the counties were financed  
 
on a more general basis and free to allocate their funds among the following 
activities: transportation, secondary education and health care. 
 
From 1986 a system of «normal costs» for bus operation was developed as a basis for 
the counties to negotiate with their concession holders over subsidy (normal cost - 
fare box revenue). This emerged as the pressure on budgets became harder. Legal 
practice had given the concession holders a strong position. It was very rare if anyone 
lost a concession or went bankrupt. In this period, tendering processes came on the 
political agenda for supply of a variety of public goods and services. From 1991 the 
act of transportation introduced competitive tendering and from the spring of 1994 the 
amendments passed the parliament. 
 
The act of transportation has a clause that gives the operators the right of redemption 
if more than 20% of their production is put out on tender within 1 year or more than 
50% within 5 years from the first tender. This clause is in action until 8 years after the 
law came into action. 
 
As a consequence the state has cut their transfers to the counties by 140 mill NOK for 
1995. This equals an estimated saving of 10% on total cost on 20% of route 
production. Further cuts came in 1996 (54 mill) and is proposed for 1997 (54 mill). 
 
From 1987 to 1994 total cost per vehicle km of bus operation is reduced by 5% and 
fare revenue per vehicle km is increased by 9% in real terms (Frøysadal and Hagen 
1996). Overall patronage is stabilised at approx. 12 passenger km per vehicle km. The 
subsidy rate is reduced from 36.5% to 27% over the same period. These figures are 
national. In Bergen (the second largest city in Norway) the subsidy rate is reduced 
from 32% in 1990, to 9% in 1995. In Trondheim (the third largest city in Norway) the 
subsidy rate is reduced from 25% in 1990 to 6.5 in 1995 (Stangeby and Norheim 
1995). 
 
In this period and until today we have seen an accelerating tendency toward 
concentration in the Norwegian bus industry. Mergers  due to the redemption clause 
are rare but buy-outs and co-operation among individual companies through chains is  
something we have seen weekly over the last two years. The largest group is 
controlled by the Norwegian State Railways with 1400 buses. 
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However tendering have not yet become the usual way to establish the contractual 
relationship between operators and authorities in Norway as expected. An assessment 
of the tendering process in Oppland county points out some explanations for this 
(Johansen and Stenstadvold 1996). One reason for this seems to be the companies 
right to claim redemption if more than 20% of their route production are tendered out 
in a single year. In a situation with many small companies this makes it difficult for  
 
authorities to find areas that easily can be defined for tender and isolated with respect 
to users benefit and fare-box revenue without exceeding the 20%.  
 
Another reason might be the tradition with net cost contracts. Due to this the 
authorities have less information than in the other Scandinavian countries. Obviously 
competitive tendering is much easier to implement with full cost contracts. For full 
cost contracts the authorities need more operational information and competence than 
with the traditional net cost contracts. This implies that more resources have to be 
used in the responsible public authorities. Their budgets are tightened over the last 
years and it is thereby hard to buy the competence needed. 
 
In some of the larger cities the subsidies to public transport have declined to near zero 
over the last few years, due to fare increases and cost reductions. In these areas 
tendering process could be beneficial from the passenger’s view but since subsidy is 
low, the incitements to test the market by tendering is weak. 
 
Several counties have established agreements with their operators to increase 
efficiency over a period of 2-5 years. The operators agree to cut costs and subsidy. On 
the other hand the authority will not use tendering for the specified period.  
 
The only urban area where a small bus network (15-20 buses) is tendered out in 
Norway so far is Lillehammer in Oppland county. In this case the authority has taken 
over the responsibility for fare revenue, marketing and information. Adjusted for costs 
associated with these responsibilities, the cost reduction is estimated to 20%. The 
service was improved by better buses (low-floor, low emission) and improved 
information from day 1 (15 November 1995) of the new operator. This led to 
improved patronage by 30%, increased fare revenue by 20% and in turn increased 
frequency of the service by 5%. The success depends as much on careful planning and 
good practice from the county authority, as on the tender itself. (Johansen and 
Stenstadvold 1996). 
 
3.6.3 Great Britain 
The impact of competitive tendering on bus services in Great Britain is reviewed by 
Mackie and Preston (1996, pp 81-85, 169-172).  Two systems of tendering are in 
place in Great Britain: a system of comprehensive tendering in London and a system 
of tendering for socially necessary services outside London.  Initial tendering in 
London, reviewed by Glaister and Beesley (1991) indicated that over a five year 
period costs for tendered routes had decreased by 16% (when administrative and 
supervisory costs are taken into account), compared to a 20% decrease in London 
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Buses Limited’s (LBL) overall unit costs (which included substantial non tendered 
service).  Glaister and Beesley also found that the use of combination bids had the 
potential to distant the market.  Kennedy (1995) finds that costs had reduced by 25% 
by 1992, although tendering was only one element of a complex set of policies that  
 
 
 
included LBL restructuring and privatisation.  Mackie, Preston and Nash (1995) find 
that by 1994 unit costs in London had come down by 35% and subsidy by 47%, with 
there being some evidence that privatisation was a major spur to cost reductions.   
 
Kennedy’s work was also important in that it found that although contract prices 
(based on minimum costs) did not vary with the number of bidders, they did vary with 
the variance of bids, suggesting that, at least in the early stages of the process the 
winner’s curse (or the risk of it) affects bid prices. 
 
Outside London, the situation is more complex because the tendered network has 
important interactions with the commercial network.  Subsidy levels have decreased 
by 35% but this masks a move from blanket subsidies to subsidies targeted at users.  
Revenue support has decreased by 60% (Mackie and Preston, op cit., p 161).  There is 
some evidence that it was competition in the tendered market (where independents 
have a much greater market share than in the commercial market) which acted as the 
main spur to cost reduction programmes introduced by the major incumbent 
operators. 
 
Some important work has been undertaken by White and Tough (1993, 1995) that 
indicates that minimum cost tenders require around 13% less subsidy than minimum 
subsidy tenders because they attract a greater number of bidders and they find that bid 
price reduces with the number of bids for minimum cost tenders but not for minimum 
subsidy tenders.  This result differs from that of Kennedy in London but this may be 
because there is a greater degree of certainty for costs in the Shire counties that White 
and Tough studies than in London.  Mackie and Preston in analysing winning bids in 
West Yorkshire based on minimum subsidy found that prices did not vary with the 
number of bidders.  They suggest that minimum cost tenders, particularly in areas 
unaffected by traffic congestion and labour shortages, may have features of an 
independent value auction in that bid price varies with the number of bidders.  In such 
cases, it is important to sustain a high number of bidders.  By contrast, minimum 
subsidy tenders may have some of the feature of a common value auction in that bid 
price is not affected by the number of bidders but may be affected by the variance of 
bids. 
 
Pickup et al. (1991, chapter seven) provide some additional evidence that longer 
tenders attract lower prices and that vehicle size and age specifications may increase 
costs by 5 - 10%. 
 
3.6.4 The Netherlands 
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Tendering has been limited to two experiments in rural areas.  Bidders were asked to 
suggest a better network for the same amount  of subsidy as the present operator.  In 
Limburg this resulted in an American company (Vancom) winning with 30% more 
bus-km for the same  subsidy.  In Sealand, the incumbent won the contract with 15% 
more bus-km than the year before.  Despite the dominance of a national operator  
 
(VSN - with a 98% market share), five serious bids were received for each tender.  
This approach may be criticised for being based on a coarse supply oriented set of  
selection criteria  with unclear incentives, but it did illustrate that competition was 
feasible in the Netherlands (Van de Velde, 1995).  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
There is a large number of organisational and regulatory forms in practice in urban 
public transport in Europe.  The key distinctions are between the classic regulated 
publicly owned monopoly, the deregulated free market and models of limited 
competition based on competitive tendering and other forms of contract.   However, 
this threefold distinction is a simplification and there are a large number of further 
sub-divisions, particularly for the limited competition models. 
 
Our theoretical work, based primarily on principal-agent theory, suggests the 
following.  Competitive tendering may be most appropriate for operational functions, 
may be possible for tactical functions but is not appropriate for strategic functions 
(section 2.1).  Private firms tend to be more effective than public firms in maximising 
profits because they are better incentivised through shareholder monitoring and 
bankruptcy and take-over constraints, whilst they are less prone to political 
interference.  Management Employee Buy-Outs tend to be transient phenomenon 
unless restrictions are made to selling the business on (section 2.2).  Competitive 
tendering based on minimum subsidy and quality incentives should be more efficient 
than minimum cost methods, but this assumes either perfect knowledge or risk 
neutrality.  Given that firms are likely to possess imperfect knowledge and be risk 
averse,  the determination of the most appropriate contract form becomes an empirical 
issue (section 2.3).  Given various micro-economic features of the urban public 
transport market, most noticeably user economies of scale and the related concepts of 
network benefits and intra-marginal demand, there may be arguments for public 
intervention in terms of finance, if not in terms of planning and operation.  
Competition may reduce net economic benefit if it merely leads to a duplication of 
services (section 2.4) or leads to price wars, but can increase welfare where it leads to 
the development of new products or pricing structures (e.g. Arlanda airport rail link, 
Manchester Metrolink, moves away from high fares - section 2.5).  The overall 
conclusion is that the private competitive organisation may have advantages in terms 
of efficiency in production but the public regulated organisation  may have 
advantages in terms of consumption.  However, both perfect competition and perfect 
planning are elusive concepts.  In particular, public regulated firms may make 
inappropriate public choices in terms of investments, prices and output levels due to 
political intervention.  Competitive tendering may provide an appropriate middle 
ground, particularly for urban services, where user economies of scale are most 
important.  User economies of scale are less important for interurban services where 
free market solutions may be more appropriate. 
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In terms of empirical work, our work on partial productivity and other indices for the 
bus market may be summarised by Table 4.1.  Due to data problems and the well 
known dangers of comparing partial indicators, these results need to be treated with 
caution.  However, in terms of cost recovery it can be seen that deregulated  markets 
have a much better performance (covering 85% of costs) than either markets with 
limited competition or  regulated markets (who both cover 47% and 54% of costs 
respectively) .  In terms of staff productivity, we find productivity in deregulated 
markets 38% higher than in regulated markets and 5% higher than in limited 
competition markets.  A  familiar pattern also emerges when we consider unit costs.  
Costs in deregulated markets are 36% lower than in markets with limited competition, 
which in turn have costs 25% lower than regulated markets.   
 
When we consider loads, the pattern is reversed.  Regulated markets have mean loads 
that are around double those of both deregulated and  limited competition markets 
(section 3.1).   This again suggests that although deregulated systems may be efficient 
in terms of production, regulated systems are more efficient (or, at least, more 
effective) in terms of consumption.    
 
The evidence presented in section 3.1 also suggests that there may be excessive use of 
rail-based systems, whose average costs per passenger km are around twice those of 
bus, whilst revenues per passenger km are less than double those of bus.  This may 
reflect an inefficiency in consumption of regulated systems (i.e. excessive 
consumption of rail services at the expense of bus services). 
 
TABLE 4.1: COMPARISON OF KEY INDICATORS FOR  
URBAN BUS SERVICES 
 
 R/TC PK/VK VK/SN TC/VK 
Deregulated 
GB 
 
0.85 
 
14.3 
 
20,399 
 
1.44 
Limited Comp. 
DK,FR,FI,NO,
SE 
 
0.47 
 
11.9 
 
19,383 
 
2.26 
Regulated 
AT,BE,DE,ES,
GR,IT,LU,PT, 
NL 
 
0.54 
 
25.5 
 
14,776 
 
3.02 
 
Macro-economics considerations related to the Maastricht agreement  should put 
pressure on member states to reduce subsidy levels to urban public transport.  There is 
however no sign of such convergence at present, and some evidence of divergence 
(i.e. subsidy reductions are greatest in those areas with already low levels of subsidy) 
(-section 3.2). 
 
An important issue relates to the quality of output. In section 3.3,  the three broad 
organisational forms were assessed in terms of 10 indicators.  The results are 
summarised by Table 4.2. Our results are qualitative but what they suggest is that  
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regulated systems have advantages of affordability but low fares may result in 
inadequate investments and low levels of supply.  By contrast, deregulated regimes 
may perform well in terms of supply indicators but less well in terms of most other 
indicators.  Models of limited competition may have quality advantages, particularly 
if contracts include appropriate incentives.  These results may though reflect the 
political context as much as the organisational structure. The opinion surveys seem to 
confirm the perceived efficiency and effectiveness of limited competition models. 
 
TABLE 4.2:  SUMMARY OF QUALITY INDICATORS 
 
 Regulated Limited Comp. Deregulated 
Supply - 0 + 
Network Design 0/+ 0/+ - 
Effectiveness 0 0 - 
Convenience 0 0 - 
Environmental 0 0 - 
Speed 0 0 0 
Security 0/+ 0/+ - 
Affordability + 0 - 
Delivery 0 + 0 
Customer Opinions 0 + 0 
    + = Good Performance - = Poor Performance 0 = Neutral Performance. 
 
Our econometric analysis has been limited by data problems but we have been able to 
develop a translog cost model, which suggests that the average European bus network 
exhibits mild diseconomies of both density and scale.  From a cost efficiency point of 
view, operators are producing too many line km and, particularly, too many vehicle 
kms.  The optimal firm size may be around 100 vehicles.  It may be sensible, from a 
cost point of view, to unbundle bus companies into a series of smaller companies 
based on individual depots.  There also appears to be a high degree of substitutability 
between labour and capital as well as relatively high input price elasticities, 
particularly for labour.  Only operators in Great Britain have costs statistically 
different from those elsewhere, being some 56% lower (section 3.4).   
 
This evidence is consistent with that presented in Table 4.1 and suggests that the cost 
difference between Great Britain and the rest of Europe can not be attributed to scale 
effects and input prices.  This work confirms the advantage of deregulated systems in 
terms of efficiency in production.  Work has subsequently been undertaken to 
examine the causes of the 40% plus reduction in bus costs per km that has occurred in 
Great Britain since deregulation. Around one third of this cost reduction can be 
attributed to reductions in the work force.  If this redundant labour  can not be 
usefully redeployed , then some 13% of the cost reduction benefits are lost.  A further 
third of this cost reduction is due to reductions in wage rates and fuel prices. To the 
extent that these are transfers a further 13% of the cost reduction benefit is lost.  Thus 
under some extreme circumstances, it may be argued that only cost reductions of 
around 13% may  
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be achieved.  These are the types of savings being achieved in Scandinavia where 
redundancies and wage cuts are not the norm. 
 
We have also developed a constant elasticity demand model, which indicates that the 
average fare elasticity is -0.4 and the service elasticity is 0.4, although there are 
important differences between small and large cities (section 3.5).  The model also 
indicates that, all other things being equal, demand is greatest in regulated markets, 
particularly in Germany and Switzerland, although this may also reflect greater 
control of bus's main competitor, the car.  This again suggests the possibility of 
efficiency in consumption. 
 
Empirical work on tendering (section 3.6) suggests that cost reductions of between 
10% and 20% are possible where the industry is not simultaneously restructured, 
increasing to 35% in London after restructuring (fragmentation and privatisation).   
Evidence is also beginning to emerge on the effectiveness of different forms of 
contracts.  In particular, it appears that minimum cost contracts may require 13% less 
subsidy than minimum subsidy contracts in cases where there is plenty of competition 
for contracts.  However, concentration of the industry may be particularly problematic 
for these type of contracts. 
 
Overall, we find some support for the contention in the Green Paper, the Citizen's 
Network, that "the concession system - where services are subject to open tender but 
within a defined operational framework - is well suited to providing an environment 
which gives incentives to operators to raise standards whilst safeguarding system 
integration".  However, there are a number of different concession/tendering schemes 
available. Furthermore the main gains of competitive tendering are unlikely to be 
from increasing efficiency in consumption but from improving productive efficiency.  
Our work suggests that in some areas unit cost reductions of up to 50% are possible - 
although reductions of 15% may be more feasible in cases where wage reductions and 
redundancies are not possible. In order to make such gains, it may be necessary to 
restructure the bus industry in many member states (principally by fragmenting 
dominant operators) and to develop anti-trust legislation sufficiently so as to prevent 
mergers and other practices primarily designed to limit competition. 
 
Finally, it is worth making a number of points that should be addressed by future 
researchers. Firstly, our work has been affected by a number of data problems that 
stem from a lack of consistent data on urban transport operations at a European level.  
There were a large number of comparability issues that the ISOTOPE database, given 
its limited resources, was unable to overcome.  Given the large amounts of taxpayers 
money that urban public transport receives it would be in the public interest for a 
consistent set of data to be collected so that assessments of value for money could be 
made.  Any move to comprehensive competitive tendering would require such a 
database to be constructed. 
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Secondly, we have outlined at least three forms of competitive tendering that could be 
applied to urban public transport.  We believe that  future work should make a more 
detailed assessment of these three forms and explore the large number of possible 
variants.  The link between organisational and regulatory structure should be also 
explored in more detail. 
 
Thirdly, in considering the trade-off between efficiency in production and 
consumption it is clear that the former is more readily measurable than the latter.  
This may have resulted in an over emphasis on cost cutting at the expense of quality 
improvements.  Consumer surplus (expressed per passenger km) might be considered 
as a possible summary measure of  efficiency in consumption.   
 
Fourthly, some of  our simulation work raised important issues.  The Arlanda study 
indicate that further information is need on the extent to which public transport 
improvements can abstract demand from the car and the extent to which it can 
generate brand new trips.  The Manchester study indicated the need for more detailed 
data on the variation of network capital and operating costs with both passenger and 
vehicle kms.   
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